14 October 2026 Legal Update

Widowed Daughter-in-Law Has Independent Right of Residence in Shared Household; Owner's Possession Decree Executable Only After Alternate Accommodation or Rent Is Secured : Delhi High Court

Case details

Case: Late Raj Kumar @ Babbal (Deceased) through LRs v. Sh. Attar Singh (RFA No. 778/2023) [2026:DHC:9028]
Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Bench: Justice Neena Bansal Krishna (single Judge; authored by Krishna, J.)

Who is who (simplified family tree)

Respondent / Plaintiff: Attar Singh, the owner of the suit property (A-5/139A, Ground Floor, Janta Flats, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi), who has two sons.
Elder son, Raj Kumar @ Babbal (Defendant No. 1): died on 25.07.2015 during the suit. He had married Manju Verma in 1990.
Younger son: Rakesh Kumar, with whom the Plaintiff moved to Flat No. A-5/209C, Paschim Vihar.
Appellants (Legal Representatives of Defendant No. 1): Appellant No. 1, Manju Verma, the widow (the Plaintiff's daughter-in-law), and Appellant Nos. 2 and 3, Nisha and Manisha, her daughters (the Plaintiff's granddaughters).
Defendant Nos. 2 to 5: commercial occupants (a kabadi shop and a photostat shop, later others) allegedly inducted into the front portion of the property by Defendant No. 1. Defendant Nos. 4 and 5 vacated and no possession relief was pressed against them.

Facts of the case

The Plaintiff claimed ownership of the suit property through an Agreement to Sell, Special Power of Attorney, General Power of Attorney, registered Receipt and Will, all dated 29.07.1988, from the original allottee, Tara Singh. Both sons lived there with their families, but he said Defendant No. 1 and his wife created trouble, so he arranged another flat for the younger son and himself.
He said Defendant No. 1's family stayed on only as licensees, that Defendant No. 1 inducted tenants into the front portion and collected rent of Rs. 4,000 per month from each, and that he disowned Defendant No. 1 and his wife by a public notice dated 04.06.2006.
A criminal complaint (Case No. 294/1/2007) was withdrawn as compromised on 19.08.2011 on Defendant No. 1's assurance that he would vacate. The Plaintiff terminated the licence by a legal notice dated 01.12.2012 and sued for possession and damages/mesne profits at Rs. 10,000 per month.
Defendant No. 1's defence was that he was a tenant paying Rs. 1,000 per month since February 2006 (so the Delhi Rent Control Act applied), that he had spent over Rs. 1 lakh making the property habitable, and that the Plaintiff had cheated him out of a shop. He was proceeded ex parte on 17.12.2013. His recall application was allowed on costs of Rs. 5,000, and when the costs were not paid his defence was struck off on 16.09.2014.
After Defendant No. 1's death, his wife and daughters were brought on record as legal representatives under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC. Their applications to set aside the order striking off the defence (Section 151 CPC) and for impleadment in their own right (Order I Rule 10 CPC) were dismissed. No issues were framed and no defence evidence was led.
On 22.05.2023 the ADJ, Delhi decreed the suit. The ADJ held that Defendant No. 1 had admitted the Plaintiff's ownership, so the legal representatives were estopped under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 from challenging title. Occupation was permissive and the licence was terminated. The ADJ directed possession and damages/mesne profits of Rs. 10,000 per month from 01.01.2013. No damages were awarded against Defendant Nos. 2 to 5 for want of privity.

Legal provisions and precedents

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act): Section 2(s) (“shared household”), Section 2(f) (“domestic relationship”), Section 17 (right to reside in a shared household), Section 19 (residence orders, including 19(1)(f) alternate accommodation) and Section 26 (relief in other proceedings).
Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA): Section 3(b) (maintenance includes residence), Section 19 (maintenance of widowed daughter-in-law by father-in-law), Section 21(vii) (dependants) and Section 22 (heirs bound to maintain dependants).
Other provisions: Section 96 and Order XLI CPC (first appeal), Order XXII Rule 4 CPC, and Section 116, Evidence Act.
Key cases: Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja ((2021) 1 SCC 414); Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi ((2022) 8 SCC 90); Navneet Arora v. Surender Kaur (213 (2014) DLT 611 (DB)); Seema Bansal v. Durga Dass Bansal (RFA 704/2019, decided 07.08.2024); Ravneet Kaur v. Prithpal Singh Dhingra (2022 SCC OnLine Del 594; SC order in SLP(C) No. 12427/2022 dated 29.07.2022); Kanchana Rai v. Geeta Sharma (2026 INSC 54); S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District ((2021) 15 SCC 730); D.S. Lakshmaiah v. L. Balasubramanyam ((2003) 10 SCC 310); Greater Mohali Area Development Authority v. Manju Jain ((2010) 9 SCC 157).

Issues before the Court

I. Whether the suit property is the “shared household” of Appellant No. 1 under Section 2(s) of the DV Act, giving her an independent right of residence and not merely a right derived through her husband.
II. Whether, after her husband's death, Appellant No. 1 is entitled to protection of her residence against eviction by her father-in-law (the owner), and what relief the parties are entitled to given the Respondent's title.

Contentions

1. Appellants (Mr. Tripurari Jha and Mr. Brajesh Kumar, Advocates):

Appellant No. 1 came to the suit property on marriage as the Plaintiff's daughter-in-law and lived there as part of the joint family, in a domestic relationship, for over 17 years (25 years of possession by the appellants). It is her “shared household” and matrimonial home. They claim no ownership and seek only protection of residence under Sections 17 and 19 of the DV Act, and the ADJ never examined this plea. They relied on Preeti Satija, Satish Chander Ahuja, Prabha Tyagi and Ravneet Kaur.
Her right is not defeated by her husband's death. The Plaintiff admitted in cross-examination that they lived together as a joint family after the marriage.
The appellants were denied a fair opportunity to defend. They were poor, represented by Legal Aid counsel, their applications were dismissed, and the suit was decided without issues or defence evidence.
The suit property, bought in 1988 for Rs. 30,000, was joint family property acquired from the family motor-repair workshop's income, with the Plaintiff as Karta. The Plaintiff shifted out under a family settlement, not because of harassment, and from 2005 had tried to dispossess them through false complaints.

2. Respondent (Mr. Shantanu Singh and Mr. Rajneesh Tingal, Advocates):

Defendant No. 1 contributed nothing to the property. It was bought by the Plaintiff from his own savings (stated as 1990 in the reply), and Defendant No. 1 was merely learning the trade from him.
Defendant No. 1 and Appellant No. 1 lived there on permission, as licensees, not under any family settlement or independent right, and the Plaintiff moved out because they harassed the family. The appellants have no independent right as a shared household. The Respondent defended the ADJ's findings on possession and mesne profits and sought dismissal of the appeal.

Reasoning of the Court

1. Title and the joint-family plea

It is admitted that the Plaintiff purchased the property in 1988 by the documents mentioned above. Nothing shows any joint family business or contribution by Defendant No. 1. The Plaintiff deposed that the properties were self-acquired and that Defendant No. 1 was paid Rs. 5,000 per month when working with him, and this was not shaken in cross-examination. Under D.S. Lakshmaiah, there is no presumption that property is joint family property merely because the family is joint, and the burden lies on the person asserting it.
Defendant No. 1's own written statement did not deny the Plaintiff's ownership, and his plea of tenancy at Rs. 1,000 per month was itself an acknowledgment of the Plaintiff as owner. The tenancy plea was also unsubstantiated, since no rent receipts were issued and the Plaintiff denied receiving any rent. Defendant No. 1 and his family were therefore mere permissive users.
Having stepped into his shoes (Order XXII Rule 4(2) CPC), the legal representatives could not question the title he had admitted, and the ADJ rightly applied Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The appellants also disclaimed ownership in their grounds of appeal. The challenge to title therefore failed, leaving only the question of whether the property is Appellant No. 1's shared household.
The shared household plea was not raised in the written statement or considered by the ADJ, but the right of residence is a legal question on facts that the Plaintiff's own pleadings and testimony establish. Relying on Manju Jain (pure questions of law can be raised even in appeal) and Section 26 of the DV Act (reliefs available in any civil proceeding), the Court took it up.

2. Issue I: shared household and independent right of residence

The definition in Section 2(s) is not confined to property in which the woman or her husband has any right, title or interest. What matters is that she has lived in the household in a domestic relationship (Satish Chander Ahuja: even a relative's property can qualify). Section 17(1) opens with a non-obstante clause and gives every woman in a domestic relationship the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or interest. Section 17(2) bars eviction except “in accordance with the procedure established by law”.
Prabha Tyagi: the right under Section 17(1) does not depend on first proving domestic violence, is not confined to present or continuous residence, and survives the husband's death. S. Vanitha confirms that statutory residence rights must be harmonised with competing entitlements.
On the facts, the Plaintiff himself pleaded that both sons lived with him with their families, and admitted in cross-examination that they lived together as a joint family after the marriage. Appellant No. 1 was thus no guest or visitor. Her continued residence of over two decades survived the Plaintiff's later move to another flat and the 2006 public notice, because Section 2(f) covers persons who “have, at any point of time, lived together”. Disowning a son does not break all legal ties (Seema Bansal).
Her right flows from her own domestic relationship with the Plaintiff's family in a household belonging to him, not from her husband's interest, so it is an independent right. Navneet Arora (approved in Satish Chander Ahuja) and Seema Bansal support this, and a decree based only on title and licence, without examining these rights, is not eviction by a just, fair and reasonable procedure. The Court held it established that the property is the shared household of Appellant No. 1 and that her right was not extinguished by her husband's death.
The Court clarified that this does not make the owner's proprietary rights otiose, and that the suit itself was maintainable because Section 17(2) contemplates eviction by due process (Satish Chander Ahuja).

3. Issue II: protection after the husband's death and the balance with title

Ordinarily the right of residence is enforced against the husband. Here he had died, so the Court looked to the HAMA. Section 19 makes a father-in-law liable to maintain his widowed daughter-in-law if she cannot maintain herself, and Section 3(b) says maintenance includes residence. Sections 21(vii) and 22 operate after the father-in-law's death (Kanchana Rai, which also referred to Article 21 and the Manu Smriti on a family head's duty).
There was nothing on record to show that Appellant No. 1 had earnings, property or a husband's estate to draw on, and the appellants were in poor financial condition. The Plaintiff, as father-in-law, therefore has an obligation to maintain her, which includes providing a residence, and her right of residence cannot be disregarded merely on the basis of his title.
The right is not an absolute bar to possession. Under Ravneet Kaur (High Court decree upheld, execution postponed until alternate accommodation was secured; Supreme Court declined to interfere but directed alternate accommodation), the Court must balance the owner's rights and mould the relief so that the woman is not left without shelter.
The Plaintiff has lived with his younger son in another flat since 2001-02, while Appellant No. 1, a widow, has lived in the suit property with her daughters for over two decades and has no other residence shown. Balancing the father-in-law's right to enjoy his property in old age with his social obligation to ensure she and her daughters are not pushed into vagrancy, the Court devised a mechanism protecting both.
Mesne profits. The Rs. 10,000 per month awarded rested only on the nature and locality of the property. The Plaintiff led no evidence of letting value beyond his bare affidavit, and in cross-examination valued the whole property at Rs. 15-20 lakh (06.02.2019) and Rs. 20-25 lakh (09.05.2019). In any event, the appellants in their shared household cannot be treated as unauthorised occupants until alternate accommodation is arranged, so the award was not sustainable.

Held

The appeal was partly allowed and the judgment and decree dated 22.05.2023 modified. The decree for possession is upheld, but it can be executed only after the Respondent first secures suitable alternate accommodation for Appellant No. 1, in the same or a nearby locality and commensurate with what she enjoys in the suit property, or alternatively pays rent of Rs. 15,000 per month, which should be sufficient to secure such accommodation. The Executing Court must ensure compliance before giving effect to the decree. The decree for damages/mesne profits against the appellants is set aside. Pending applications were disposed of.

Key legal principles established

A daughter-in-law who has lived in the husband's family home in a domestic relationship has an independent right of residence in that shared household, irrespective of title, and the right does not depend on her husband's interest in the property or on any act of domestic violence.
Her husband's death does not by itself end the right or change the premises' character as her shared household. A later estrangement or a public notice disowning the son does not undo the domestic relationship.
The right of residence can be raised in a civil suit for possession, even for the first time in appeal as a pure question of law (Section 26 DV Act; Manju Jain).
A widowed daughter-in-law who cannot maintain herself is entitled to maintenance from her father-in-law under Section 19 HAMA, and maintenance includes residence (Section 3(b)).
The right of residence is not an absolute bar to the owner's suit. The owner can obtain a possession decree, but the court must mould relief so the woman is not deprived of shelter, making execution conditional on alternate accommodation or sufficient rent.
Legal representatives who step into the defendant's shoes cannot challenge the title the deceased admitted (Section 116, Evidence Act), and the burden of proving joint family property lies on the person asserting it.
Mesne profits need evidence of letting value, and occupants protected as a shared household are not unauthorised occupants until alternate accommodation is secured.