18 September 2026 Legal Updates

'Equal Pay For Equal Work' Doctrine Cannot Be Mechanically Applied, Experience Can Justify Pay Difference: Supreme Cour

Case details

Case: G.P. Sangeetha and Ors. Etc. Etc. v. State of Kerala and Ors., with Sharafudden. M. v. Indu T.K. and Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 7565–7567 of 2011, with Civil Appeal No. 9060 of 2011)
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu

Facts of the case

The appellants are Higher Secondary School Teachers, Junior (“HSST, Jr.”), working in Government-aided schools in Kerala, appointed through direct recruitment under a Government Order dated 13.05.1998.
Within the same cadre of HSST, Jr. teachers, there were two groups: (a) teachers appointed by direct recruitment (the appellants), and (b) teachers appointed by transfer or promotion from lower/high schools, who were being paid full-time pay scale.
The appellants (direct recruits) filed writ petitions claiming the same full-time pay scale that was being given to the transferred/promoted teachers, contending that their qualifications, duties, and responsibilities were identical.
The Single Judge of the Kerala High Court allowed their writ petitions (order dated 22.12.2009), relying on a line of older Supreme Court decisions on equal pay for equal work, and held that the direct recruits had been subjected to discrimination.
On intra-court appeal by the State of Kerala and the Director of Higher Secondary Education, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court reversed the Single Judge's decision (judgment dated 22.03.2011), holding that promoted teachers and directly recruited teachers could not be treated as equal despite doing the same period of work, since the benefit to promotees was meant to protect the status/benefits they already enjoyed as full-time teachers before their promotion — unlike the direct recruits, who were freshers.
Aggrieved by the Division Bench's ruling, the direct recruit teachers appealed to the Supreme Court.

Contentions of the appellants (direct recruit teachers)

Within one and the same cadre of HSST, Jr. teachers, there could be no valid difference in pay scales once it is admitted that the qualifications, duties, and responsibilities of both groups — those directly recruited and those appointed by transfer/promotion — are identical.
Relying on the decision in State of West Bengal v. Anirban Ghosh, 2020 SCC OnLine Cal 3316 (a Calcutta High Court Division Bench ruling, whose special leave petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 16.07.2024), it was argued that the reasoning in State of Bihar v. Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee, (2019) 18 SCC 301 should be distinguished and not applied against them.

Reasoning of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court (as reproduced and considered by the Supreme Court)

Promoted teachers, prior to their promotion, were full-time permanent high school or lower school teachers with long years of service, who qualified for promotion to Higher Secondary Schools by virtue of seniority and educational qualification.
The Government's object in granting full-time pay and allowances to such promotees was to protect and retain the status and benefits they already enjoyed as full-time teachers before promotion — essentially a recognition of past service — rather than an assessment of the work now being performed.
The direct recruits, by contrast, were freshers entering service for the first time; despite performing the same period of work as part-time teachers, they could not be equated with promotees under Article 14, since Article 14 applies only “among equals,” and there was a real, relevant difference between the two groups justifying differential treatment.

Reasoning of the Supreme Court

The Court noted that all the precedents relied upon by the Single Judge (Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889; General Manager, South Central Railway v. A.V.R. Siddhanti, AIR 1974 SC 1755; and others) were decided in the last century, and that judicial interpretation of “equal pay for equal work” has since undergone a significant shift.
Tracing the doctrine's evolution, the Court explained that in the earlier era (following Randhir Singh v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 618), equal pay for equal work was treated as an expansive anti-exploitation principle under Articles 14 and 39(d), where mere sameness of designation (teacher with teacher, clerk with clerk) sufficed to claim parity.
In the present century, beginning with State Bank of India v. M.R. Ganesh Babu, (2002) 4 SCC 556 and culminating in State of Bihar v. Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee, (2019) 18 SCC 301, the doctrine has been recast into a strict test: a claimant must establish complete parity not merely in the nature of work, but also in source of recruitment, educational qualifications and experience, mode of appointment through a constitutional process, and nature of responsibilities and accountability. Mere functional similarity of work is no longer sufficient.
The Court extracted the governing principle from M.R. Ganesh Babu (supra) — that equal pay depends on the nature of work, factoring in qualitative differences in reliability and responsibility, and that a bona fide, reasonable, and rational value judgment by the administrative authority in fixing pay scales does not amount to discrimination and is not ordinarily open to judicial interference.
It further relied on the 3-Judge Bench decisions in Government of West Bengal v. Tarun Kumar Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347 (holding that a higher educational qualification, or difference in source of recruitment, can justify differential treatment as a reasonable classification) and State of Haryana v. Charanjit Singh, (2006) 9 SCC 321 (holding that equal pay requires “complete and wholesale identity” between the comparator groups, and that merit, experience, mode of selection, and educational qualification are all valid bases for differentiation in pay).
Applying this settled framework, the Court held that the experience of transferee/promotee HSST, Jr. teachers, compared to that of direct recruit HSST, Jr. teachers, provides a valid and intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved (protecting the status and benefits promotees already held as full-time teachers before their promotion) — justifying a higher pay scale for the former.
On the appellants' reliance on Anirban Ghosh (supra), the Court found that the decisions of the Supreme Court noticed in Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee (supra) did not appear to have been placed before the Calcutta High Court Division Bench in that case; to the extent inconsistent with binding Supreme Court precedent, Anirban Ghosh was held to be per incuriam. The Court also clarified that mere dismissal of the special leave petition against Anirban Ghosh, without reasons, did not bind the Court to take a different view.

Held

The Supreme Court held that since the two groups of teachers (direct recruits and transferees/promotees) could not claim equivalence in experience of rendering service as teachers, this was a valid criterion for differentiation in pay scales. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court was found not to merit interference. The appeals were accordingly dismissed, and pending applications, if any, stood disposed of.

Key legal principles established

The doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” under Articles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution has shifted from an expansive anti-exploitation principle (where sameness of designation or period of work sufficed) to a strict test requiring complete parity in source of recruitment, educational qualifications and experience, mode of appointment, and nature of responsibilities and accountability — mere functional similarity of work is not enough.
A bona fide, reasonable, and rational value judgment by administrative/governmental authorities in fixing pay scales, based on an intelligible criterion having a nexus with the object of differentiation, does not amount to discrimination under Article 14 and is ordinarily not open to interference by courts.
A higher educational qualification, greater experience, or a different source/mode of recruitment can each independently justify a reasonable classification for differential pay, even where employees perform functionally similar work.
Pay benefits granted to promotees to protect and retain the status and benefits they already held prior to promotion (as recognition of past service) are validly distinguishable from the position of fresh direct recruits entering service for the first time, even if both groups currently perform the same work for the same period.
A precedent that fails to consider binding decisions of a higher court directly on point can be held per incuriam to that extent; the mere dismissal of a special leave petition against such a precedent, without recorded reasons, does not, by itself, compel a court to follow that precedent in a subsequent case.