6 August 2026 Legal Updates

Supreme Court Extends Section 498A IPC to Live-In Relationships “in the Nature of Marriage”

Case Details

• Case Title: Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.
• Court: Supreme Court of India
• Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh

Facts of the Case

• The complainant alleged that she and the petitioner were in a marital or marriage-like domestic relationship and that she had been subjected to cruelty by him and his relatives. Criminal proceedings were initiated under Section 498A IPC. The petitioner sought quashing of the case, principally arguing that no legally valid marriage existed between the parties and that he could therefore not be regarded as a “husband” for the purpose of Section 498A.
• The Karnataka High Court refused to quash the proceedings. It adopted a purposive interpretation of Section 498A and held that the protection against domestic cruelty could not necessarily be denied merely because the marriage was alleged to be void or because the relationship was not formally solemnised. The petitioner challenged that ruling before the Supreme Court. The Court clarified that its observations at the quashing stage did not determine whether the factual allegations of cruelty were ultimately proved.

Issues Raised

• Whether the expression “husband” in Section 498A IPC can include a man in a live-in relationship that is “in the nature of marriage.”
• Whether denying Section 498A protection to a woman solely because her marriage-like relationship lacked formal legal recognition violates Article 14.
• What characteristics must a live-in relationship possess before it can be treated as a relationship in the nature of marriage?
• Whether extending Section 498A to such relationships amounts to impermissible judicial creation of a criminal offence.
• What safeguards must apply to prevent automatic arrest and misuse of the extended interpretation?

Court’s Reasoning and Key Findings

1. Section 498A Is a Protective Social-Welfare Provision

• The Supreme Court examined the object for which Section 498A was introduced. The provision was enacted to address cruelty and harassment inflicted upon women within matrimonial households, including wilful conduct capable of causing grave physical or mental injury or driving a woman to suicide.
• The Court held that the provision should not be interpreted so technically that its protective purpose is defeated. The nature of the harm suffered by a woman remains the same whether the cruelty is committed by a formally wedded husband or by a partner in a stable relationship that functions like a marriage.

2. Purposive Interpretation of the Word “Husband”

• The Court adopted a purposive interpretation of the expression “husband.” Under purposive interpretation, statutory language is understood in the light of the object and mischief that the enactment seeks to remedy.
• The Court held that, for Section 498A alone, the expression may extend to a male partner in a relationship that genuinely qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage.”
• This does not mean that every boyfriend, casual partner or person in a short-term relationship becomes a “husband.” The relationship must possess characteristics substantially resembling marriage.

3. Formal Marriage Cannot Be the Sole Basis of Protection

The Court reasoned that excluding all women in marriage-like live-in relationships would produce an arbitrary distinction:

• One woman would receive protection because her marriage was formally valid.
• Another suffering identical cruelty would be excluded merely because her relationship lacked technical legal recognition.

According to the Court, this distinction had no rational connection with the object of preventing domestic cruelty. It was therefore inconsistent with Article 14.

4. Application of Article 14

• Article 14 permits reasonable classification only when two conditions are satisfied: the classification is based on an intelligible differentia; and that differentia has a rational nexus with the object of the law.
• The Court found that a distinction between a formally married woman and a woman in a relationship in the nature of marriage may be intelligible at a formal level. However, for the limited purpose of protection against cruelty, it lacked a rational nexus with the object of Section 498A.
• Both women may experience the same domestic dependency, emotional vulnerability, shared household, familial control and physical or mental abuse. Denying protection to one category would therefore amount to discriminatory treatment.

5. Freedom to Choose a Partner Does Not Mean Loss of Legal Protection

• The Court relied upon the constitutional recognition of decisional autonomy and the right to choose one’s partner in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India and Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M.
• The freedom to select a partner and determine the form of one’s intimate relationship is part of dignity, privacy and personal liberty under Article 21. The Court held that exercising this choice cannot result in forfeiture of protection against domestic cruelty.
• A woman does not lose her entitlement to legal protection merely because she chose a relationship not solemnised through a formally valid marriage.

6. Only Relationships “in the Nature of Marriage” Are Covered

The Court expressly limited the judgment to live-in relationships that qualify as relationships in the nature of marriage. The ruling does not apply automatically to every intimate or sexual relationship.

Relevant features may include:

• Both parties being consenting adults
• A relationship of reasonable stability and continuity
• Shared domestic life or household
• Public representation resembling spouses
• Emotional and financial interdependence
• An intention to create a marital-type union
• A genuine intention to marry forming an intrinsic part of the relationship

The existence of these features must be determined from the facts of each case.

7. Intention to Marry Is an Essential Requirement

• The Court placed particular importance on the parties’ intention to marry. A live-in relationship would not attract the expanded interpretation merely because the parties had a physical relationship or occasionally lived together.
• There must be material indicating that the relationship was entered into and continued as a marriage-like union, with an intention to marry forming an intrinsic part of it.
• This requirement prevents Section 498A from being extended to casual, transient, secret or purely sexual relationships.

8. Relationship Must Be Between Consenting Adults

• The Court clarified that the protected live-in relationship must be between two consenting adults. This ensures that the doctrine is not used to validate relationships prohibited by law or involving a person incapable of giving lawful consent.
• The adult and consensual character of the relationship is therefore a threshold requirement.

9. Extension Limited Strictly to Section 498A

The Supreme Court specifically confined its interpretation to Section 498A IPC.

The judgment does not automatically change the meaning of:

• “Husband” or “wife” under all other laws
• Marriage under personal laws
• Succession rights
• Legitimacy or inheritance
• Matrimonial remedies
• Maintenance provisions
• Bigamy and other marriage-specific offences

Each statutory provision must be interpreted according to its own language, object and context.

10. Penal Statute and Purposive Interpretation

• Ordinarily, penal statutes are interpreted strictly because no person should be punished for conduct not clearly criminalised by law. However, the Court treated Section 498A as both penal and protective.
• It reasoned that strict interpretation does not require courts to adopt a narrow construction that frustrates the statute’s purpose. Where the statutory expression is capable of a broader interpretation consistent with constitutional equality, the protective object may guide the Court.
• At the same time, the interpretation must remain carefully limited so that criminal liability is not extended to every informal relationship.

11. Safeguards Against Automatic Arrest

The Court recognised the serious consequences of criminal prosecution and therefore directed strict adherence to the safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar.

A complaint under Section 498A does not permit automatic arrest. Before arresting the partner or his relatives, the police must:

• Examine whether arrest is necessary
• Conduct the legally required preliminary inquiry or verification
• Apply the statutory arrest conditions
• Record reasons supporting the arrest
• Avoid mechanical detention merely because an accusation has been made

The Court stated that these safeguards must be applied strictly in cases involving relationships in the nature of marriage.

12. No Opinion on the Truth of the Allegations

The Supreme Court clarified that it was considering only whether the proceedings deserved to be quashed at the threshold.

Its discussion did not amount to a finding that:

• The relationship conclusively qualified as a relationship in the nature of marriage
• The complainant was subjected to cruelty
• The accused was guilty
• Every allegation in the complaint was true

These matters must be examined by the trial court on the basis of evidence.

Final Verdict

The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the Karnataka High Court’s order declining to quash the criminal proceedings.

It held that:

• Section 498A IPC can apply to a live-in relationship that qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage.”
• The relationship must be between consenting adults, and an intention to marry must form an intrinsic part of it.
• The interpretation is confined to Section 498A and does not automatically extend to other legal provisions.
• The arrest safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar must be strictly followed. No partner or relative should be arrested mechanically without the required inquiry and application of mind.
• The observations were limited to the quashing proceedings and did not determine the guilt of the accused.

The petition was accordingly disposed of.