02 May 2025 Legal Updates

  HIGH COURT CANNOT REJECT A PLAINT WHILE EXERCISING ARTICLE 227 POWER: SUPREME COURT  

(a) Case Title:

• K. Valarmathi & Ors. vs. Kumaresan

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India

(c) Date of Decision:

• April 29, 2025

(d) Bench:

• Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Joymalya Bagchi

FACTS

• The appellants are the legal heirs (wife and daughters) of Kathiresan, who purchased land using his own funds but registered it in the name of his nephew (the respondent) based on astrological advice. During his lifetime, Kathiresan maintained possession of the land, and after his death, the appellants claimed to continue this possession.
• When the respondent (nephew) began negotiating to sell the land, the appellants filed suits seeking declaration of title and an injunction. The respondent (nephew) approached the High Court under Article 227, seeking rejection of the plaints.
• The High Court rejected the plaint in one suit, holding it was barred under the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988.

ISSUE

Can the High Court reject a plaint (dismiss a lawsuit at its initial stage) while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?

JUDGMENT AND REASONING

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, holding that:

1. The power of the High Court under Article 227 is supervisory in nature and should be exercised sparingly.

2. This supervisory power cannot be used to:

• Usurp the original jurisdiction of lower courts
• Supplant statutory remedies available under the Civil Procedure Code (CPC)
• Bypass the appeals process

3. The CPC is a self-contained code with specific provisions (Order VII Rule 11) for rejection of plaints by trial courts, with appeals permitted under Section 96.

4. By rejecting the plaint directly, the High Court:

• Acted as a court of first instance
• Deprived the appellants of their right to appeal

KEY TAKEAWAY

The High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is limited to ensuring subordinate courts act within their jurisdiction, not to supplant their original authority.

  MERE USE OF INSULTING REMARKS LIKE 'IMPOTENT' DOESN'T CONSTITUTE ABETMENT OF SUICIDE: SUPREME COURT QUASHES CASE AGAINST HUSBAND'S IN-LAWS  

(a) Case Title:

• Shenbagavalli and Ors. v. The Inspector of Police, Kancheepuram District and Anr.

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India

(c) Date of Decision:

• April 30, 2025

(d) Bench:

• Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Augustine George Masih

FACTS

The deceased (Dinesh) and accused No. 7 (Pushpakalashree) married on September 15, 2013. Their relationship deteriorated soon after marriage. On November 10, 2013, accused No. 1-6 allegedly came to the deceased's residence, quarreled, used abusive language, and called him impotent and infertile. Pushpakalashree thereafter left with the others to her parental home. On December 9, 2013 (about a month later), Dinesh committed suicide. The deceased's mother provided torn pages from his diary containing a suicide note. Pushpakalashree and some of her family members were charged with abetment to suicide.

ISSUE

Whether the essential ingredients of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC were established against the appellants.

COURT'S ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

1. The suicide note mentioned only four people responsible for the suicide

2. After November 11, 2013, there was no contact between the deceased and any of the accused until the date of suicide (December 9, 2013)

3. There was no proximity of harassment or instigation prior to the suicide

4. No active or direct act that could have led the deceased to commit suicide was established

5. The Court emphasized that for abetment under Section 107 IPC, there must be:

• Instigation
• Conspiracy
• Intentional aid by act or illegal omission

6. Using abusive language alone does not constitute abetment without evidence of intention to instigate suicide

7. The Court referenced previous judgments establishing that proximate and direct incitement is necessary to establish abetment

JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and Quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellants

Held that the essential ingredients of Section 306 IPC were not fulfilled, and continuing the proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of law

KEY LEGAL PRINCIPLES

• Mere allegations of harassment are insufficient for abetment of suicide
• There must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to commit suicide
• The offending action must be proximate to the time of occurrence
• Mens rea (guilty mind) cannot be presumed but must be ostensibly present
• Each case must be examined on its own facts, considering all surrounding factors

  SECTION 31 OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT ONLY APPLIES TO BREACH OF PROTECTION ORDERS, NOT OTHERS SUCH AS MAINTENANCE OR RESIDENCE ORDERS: HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT  

(a) Case Title:  

• Akshay Thakur v. State of H.P. and others

(b) Court:

• High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla

(c) Date of Decision:

• April 25, 2025

(d) Bench:

• Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

FACTS

1. The petitioner, Akshay Thakur, married the complainant, Pooja Devi, on January 20, 2014. The complainant filed a case under Section 12 for reliefs under the Domestic Violence (DV) Act.

2. The Trial Court ordered the petitioner to:

• Provide separate accommodation (one room, kitchen, bathroom)
• Pay ₹10,000 as compensation
• Pay ₹4,000 monthly as maintenance

When the petitioner failed to comply with these monetary orders, the complainant filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC. The Magistrate directed the police to register an FIR, which was registered under Section 31 of the DV Act. The petitioner sought quashing of this FIR through the present petition

KEY ISSUE

Whether breach of monetary relief orders under Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (DV Act) 2005 can be penalized under Section 31 of the Act, which prescribes punishment for breach of protection orders.

PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT:

• Section 31 of the DV Act penalizes only the breach of "protection orders" (defined in Section 18)
• Monetary relief orders (Section 20) do not fall within the definition of protection orders
• Therefore, non-compliance with monetary orders cannot be penalized under Section 31

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT:

• Section 31 should be liberally construed to provide benefit to women
• Violation of monetary orders should also fall within Section 31's purview

COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Court examined several key points:

1. Statutory Interpretation:

• The Court applied the literal rule of interpretation to conclude that Section 31 specifically mentions only "protection orders" and "interim protection orders," not monetary orders.

2. Legislative Intent:

• The Court noted that the DV Act clearly segregates different types of orders (protection orders under Section 18, residence orders under Section 19, monetary orders under Section 20, etc.).

3. Penal Provisions:

• The Court emphasized that criminal statutes must be strictly construed and not extended beyond their plain meaning.

4. Judicial Precedents:

• The Court cited similar rulings from the Kerala, Karnataka, Delhi, and Telangana High Courts to support its view.

DECISION

The Court allowed the petition and quashed FIR filed by the respondent wife and all consequential proceedings, holding that:

1. Section 31 of the DV Act applies only to breach of protection orders under Section 18
2. Non-compliance with monetary relief orders under Section 20 cannot be penalized under Section 31
3. The Magistrate erred in directing the police to register an FIR for breach of monetary orders