10 December 2024 - Legal Updates

1. Section 300 IPC | Lacking Intention To Commit Murder Irrelevant If Bodily Injury Is Caused With Lethal Weapon, Likely To Cause Death: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of an individual for murder, stating that during a scuffle, the accused inflicted severe injuries to vital areas of the deceased's body using lethal weapons. The bench, consisting of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Prasanna B. Varale, dismissed the appellant's argument that the act was neither intentional nor premeditated, and therefore, he should not be punished for murder, but rather for culpable homicide.

The Court, referring to Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC (Section 101 of BNS), stated that the absence of intent to commit murder is irrelevant. The accused can still be found guilty of murder if their actions result in a bodily injury to the deceased that is likely to cause death in the normal course of events. The Court further remarked, “Even if it is assumed that the appellant-accused did not intend to inflict such bodily injury, the act of stabbing the vital parts with a knife demonstrates the knowledge that such injuries are likely to lead to death in the ordinary course.”

Justice Nath in the judgment referred to Virsa Singh vs. State of Pepsu (1958) judgment, where the Court held that to bring the case under clause 3 of Section 300 IPC, the prosecution must establish objectively:

“1. That a bodily injury is present;

2. That the nature of injury must be proved;

3. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury;

4. That the injury inflicted is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of the nature.”

The Court stated that once all four ingredients are met, the offense would be classified as murder. In the case of Virsa Singh, it was established that the intention to cause death or the knowledge that the inflicted injury could be fatal in the ordinary course of nature is irrelevant, provided it is proven that the accused intended to cause a specific bodily injury, which was indeed inflicted on the deceased.

The Court explained, "It does not matter if there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter if there was no intention to cause an injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (though there is no real distinction between the two). It does not even matter if there was no knowledge that the act would likely cause death. Once it is proven that the accused intended to cause the specific bodily injury, the rest of the inquiry is purely objective. The only question left is whether, based on objective reasoning, the injury was likely to result in death in the ordinary course of nature."

The Court concluded that the accused's claim that the incident was not premeditated was unsubstantiated, given that the injuries were inflicted on the deceased's vital body parts (lungs and heart) with a lethal weapon, which was capable of causing death in the ordinary course of nature.

The Court stated, "The defense's argument that the incident was a spontaneous scuffle does not absolve the appellant of liability. While the scuffle may have provoked the attack, the appellant's use of a lethal weapon and the manner in which the injuries were inflicted elevated the act from culpable homicide to murder. Courts have consistently ruled that intent can be inferred from the severity and nature of the injuries, the choice of weapon, and how it was used. The use of a lethal weapon and the deliberate targeting of vital body parts are strong indicators of intent."

The Court further emphasized that the nature and location of the injuries, the weapon used, and the circumstances of the attack are all crucial factors in determining the accused's liability.

The Court stated, "Given the evidence and the applicable legal principles, the appellant's request for leniency based on spontaneity and the absence of premeditation cannot be upheld. The nature and location of the injuries, the choice of weapon, and the circumstances of the attack clearly establish the appellant's responsibility for causing Subrahmannian's death. The argument that the act was committed in the heat of the moment does not lessen the severity of the offense or the appellant's culpability."

 As a result, the appeal was dismissed.

Case- Kunhimuhammed @ Kunheethu vs. The State of Kerela

2. DEATH PENALTY MUST BE COMMUTED IF EXECUTION DELAYS ARE DUE TO FACTORS BEYOND CONVICT’S CONTROL

The Supreme Court on Monday (December 9) while disposing as criminal appeal in matter of State of Maharashtra and Ors. vs. Pradeep Yashwant Kokade & Anr. with connected case, highlighted the human rights perspective in the context of death penalty cases, emphasising that prolonged delays in execution of a death penalty can have a dehumanising effect on convicts. By acknowledging that delays caused by factors beyond the prisoner’s control should lead to commutation of the death sentence, the Court underscores the importance of timely justice and the recognition of evolving standards of humane treatment.

Three Judge bench of the Court consisting of Justice Abhay Oka, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, and Justice Augustine George Masih, explained that is firmly established that Article 21 of the Constitution not only applies at the time of sentencing but also extends to the execution stage. A prolonged delay in carrying out a death sentence has a degrading impact on the accused. When such a delay is both excessive and unexplained, and caused by factors beyond the prisoner’s control, it necessitates the commutation of the death sentence.

The Court made these observations while rejecting appeals filed by the State of Maharashtra, which challenged the 2019 Bombay High Court decision that commuted the death sentences of two convicts (Respondents in the appeal), to life imprisonment with a fixed term of 35 years.

The bench outlined several legal principles for the judiciary and executive authorities, underscoring the need to protect the constitutional rights of death row prisoners under Article 21. 

1. Right to Challenge Delay

Convicts experiencing undue, unexplained, and excessive delays in the execution of death sentences can seek relief from the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. However, the Court clarified that it would not reconsider the judicial decisions affirming the death sentence but would instead review all relevant circumstances to address the issue of inordinate delay.

2. Suspense and Psychological Impact

The Court stated that prolonged delays in the consideration of mercy petitions by the Governor or President result in adverse physical conditions and psychological stress on the convict. It ruled that such delays violate Article 21 of the Constitution and cannot be justified merely by the seriousness of the crime. It emphasised that while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 32 and Article 21 of the Constitution, the Court must take into account the impact of such delays and cannot justify them solely based on the severity of the crime.

3. Sessions Court Responsibility

The Court ruled that excessive delays in issuing execution warrants by the Sessions Court, as required by Sections 413 and 414 of the CrPC [Section 453 & 454 of BNSS], violate Article 21 if they cause undue mental and physical suffering for the convict.

4. Case-Specific Determination of Delay

The Court stated that a fixed duration for what constitutes “inordinate” or “undue” delay cannot be established, highlighting that the assessment must be case-specific, considering the circumstances and the impact on the convict.

5. High Court Jurisdiction

The Court ruled that convicts have the right to approach High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge excessive delays in execution. High Courts are to apply the same principles established by the Supreme Court.

6.  Executive Responsibility

Regarding executive responsibility, the Court directed the government to handle mercy petitions swiftly, ensuring that relevant documents are promptly sent to the Governor or President to avoid unnecessary delays. The Court also outlined detailed procedural guidelines for both the executive and judiciary to follow in handling mercy petitions and the execution of death sentences, aiming to prevent delays in the process.

Case- State of Maharashtra and Ors. vs. Pradeep Yashwant Kokade and Anr.

3. Basic Purpose of Order XVIII Rule 17 of CPC is to Enable Court to Clarify Position, Not to Fill Lacuna In Evidence: Calcutta High Court

Justice Sugato Majumdar of the Calcutta High Court, while dismissing an application under Order XVIII Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the CPC, 1908, stated, "Unexplained delay and lethargy in producing a document that is otherwise available cannot be remedied at this late stage. Therefore, this is not a case where the application should be granted."

The judgment arises from a recovery suit filed in 2011 by the sellers and former directors of M/s. Bhoomi Minerals Ltd., who held the controlling block of shares, following the distressed sale of the company due to the failure of a Memorandum of Understanding ('MoU') between the parties. A counter-suit was filed in 2012 by the intended first buyer and party to the MoU, and both cases are being heard together by the Court.

The application sought to recall the seller's witness for further cross-examination, specifically to confront him with the list of shareholders of the company. It is acknowledged that this application was filed after the seller had concluded their arguments and submitted a preliminary note on the subject suits. The need for this application arose when the intended first buyer discovered a list of shareholders from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs' website, at this stage of the proceedings. When this newly discovered information was compared with the evidence presented by the seller's witness, who was one of the company's former directors, it became necessary to recall him for further examination.

On the other hand, the advocate for the sellers and ex-directors of the company argued that the application was an abuse of the legal process, as it was filed at a belated stage, after the conclusion of submissions and arguments and the filing of preliminary written notes. Furthermore, the witness in question had already undergone an extensive and detailed examination over a period of four years, during which approximately 180 questions were posed. It was acknowledged that the list of shareholders had been publicly available since September 30, 2011, even before the suit and counter-suit were filed. Despite this, the intended first buyer had failed to include any reference to the list in their plaint or in their Judge's Brief. Allowing the application, therefore, would constitute a departure from the case they had initially presented. The application, moreover, was filed after multiple adjournments had been sought before the commencement of arguments, which was seen as a deliberate tactic to delay the proceedings, knowing that their suit, filed as a counter-blast to the seller’s suit, lacked merit and was entirely misconceived.

After considering the matter, the Court rejected the application, stating that there was no explanation as to why the intended first buyer did not attempt to locate the documents they sought to introduce, especially since these documents had been available well before the filing of both the suit and the counter-suit. The intended first buyer only realized the need to check the Ministry of Corporate Affairs' official website after the witness testimony had concluded. The Court noted, "It is not just a matter of the application being filed at a late stage; there is no explanation provided in this regard."

While in certain cases, a witness may be recalled, the Supreme Court has clarified that such power is discretionary and should be exercised sparingly, only in appropriate situations to clarify any issues or doubts. It further stated that this power is not meant to fill gaps or omissions in the witness's evidence. Allowing the application would merely serve to address the omissions in the evidence. The Court concluded, "Unexplained delay and lethargy in producing a document that is otherwise available cannot be remedied at this late stage."

Case- Sri Nirmal Kanodia & Ors. vs. Umadevi Agrawal & Anr.