24 March 2025 Legal Updates

  Person Need Not Be Named As Accused In Complaint To Retain Seized Property Under Section 8(3) Prevention Of Money Laundering Act: Supreme Court  

a. Case Title:

• Union of India v. J.P. Singh 

b. Court:

• Supreme Court of India 

c. Date of Decision:

• 05.03.2025

d. Bench:  

• Justices Abhay S Oka and N Kotiswar Singh.

Facts

• The Enforcement Directorate (ED) registered an ECIR (March 17, 2017) against J.P. Singh and others. 
• Items (electronic devices, documents, cash) were seized during a search (October 13, 2017). 
• The Adjudicating Authority confirmed the seizure under Section 8(3) PMLA (April 4, 2018). 
• A complaint under Section 44 PMLA was filed (February 8, 2018), and cognizance was taken by the Special Court. 
• The Appellate Authority and High Court ruled that the retention order lapsed after 90 days under amended Section 8(3)(a). 

Issue

Whether the retention of seized property under Section 8(3) PMLA requires the person to be named as an accused in the complaint and whether the 90-day limit (post-2018 amendment) applies retroactively. 

Legal Analysis

1. Applicable Version of Section 8(3): 

• The order was passed on April 4, 2018, when the pre-amendment Section 8(3) (valid till April 18, 2018) was in force. This version allowed retention "during the pendency of proceedings" without a 90-day limit. 
• The amended Section 8(3)(a) (effective April 19, 2018) introduced a 90-day limit during investigation but permitted continuation if court proceedings were pending. 
• For retention under Section 8(3), it is sufficient that proceedings (complaint) under PMLA are pending before the court. Naming the person as an accused is not required.
• The pre-amendment law applied, and even under the amended clause, retention would continue as the complaint was pending. 

2. Decision

• The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Appellate Authority and High Court. 
• Restored the Adjudicating Authority’s order (April 4, 2018), clarifying that retention continues till the disposal of the complaint. 

Key Takeaway

1. Legal Principle:

• Retention of property under PMLA does not require the person to be named as an accused in the complaint. The retention period depends on the version of Section 8(3) applicable when the order is passed. 

2. Amendment Impact:

• Post-2018 amendments impose a 90-day limit during investigation but allow retention if court proceedings are ongoing. 

  Candidates Can't Be Rejected Solely Because They Had Higher Degrees Than Prescribed Qualification: Supreme Court  

a. Case Title:

• Chandra Shekhar Singh & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand & Ors. 

b. Court:

• Supreme Court of India 

c. Date of Decision:

• 20th March 2025

d. Bench:

• Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sandeep Mehta.

Facts

Appellants (candidates for Food Safety Officer posts) held Master’s degrees in Microbiology/Food Science. 

• Recruitment Notification (2015) required a "degree" in specified subjects (e.g., Food Technology, Microbiology) or a Master’s in Chemistry. 
• Disqualification: Appellants were rejected as the State interpreted "degree" to mean only Bachelor’s (except for Chemistry, which allowed Master’s). 
• High Court’s Decision: Upheld the State’s interpretation, leading to this appeal. 

Issues

• Whether "degree" in the FSS Act/rules includes Master’s/Doctorate degrees. 
• Whether the State Government can restrict "degree" to Bachelor’s when the Central Government prescribes qualifications. 

Legal Analysis

1. Definition of "Degree" under UGC Act (Section 22(3)):

• includes Bachelor’s, Master’s, and Doctorate degrees unless explicitly excluded. 

2. Recruitment Notification Interpretation:

•    The FSS Rules (2011) and notification used the term "degree" without excluding higher qualifications. 
•    A 2022 amendment explicitly clarified that "degree" includes Bachelor’s, Master’s, and Doctorate. 

3.  Arbitrariness:

• Excluding candidates with higher qualifications (Master’s) in relevant subjects was unreasonable and discriminatory. 

Decision

Supreme Court’s allowed the appeal, quashing the High Court’s judgment and held that "Degree" in the FSS Rules includes all levels (Bachelor’s, Master’s, Doctorate) unless explicitly restricted. 

Appellants to be accommodated in the recruitment process (via supernumerary posts if necessary) but without back wages. 

  Arbitrator's Mandate Can Be Extended If Non-Completion Of Proceedings In 12 Months Is Due To Delays Not Attributable To Petitioner: Himachal Pradesh HC  

a.Case Title:

• Gopinder Singh versus The Land Acquisition Officer Cum Competent Authority (SLAU) and Another

b. Court:

• High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla

c. Decided on:

March 17, 2025

d. Judge:

• Justice Ranjan Sharma

Background

The petitioners (Gopinder Singh and Narender Singh) challenged orders dated February 16, 2024, where an Arbitrator terminated his mandate and kept arbitration proceedings in abeyance. These proceedings related to land acquisition disputes concerning the Mandi-Gagal-Baggi-Janjehi and Shimla via Churag Karsog highway (NH-21).

Facts

• Land belonging to petitioners was acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956
• Petitioners, dissatisfied with the compensation award of December 15, 2016, filed reference petitions before the Arbitrator (Divisional Commissioner, Mandi Division)
• The arbitration proceedings, initiated in 2018, continued until February 2024
• The Arbitrator terminated his mandate citing inability to complete proceedings within the statutory timeframe (18 months) under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Issues

• Whether the Court could extend the mandate of an Arbitrator after the statutory period expired
• What constitutes "sufficient cause" to extend arbitration proceedings beyond the statutory period

Court's Analysis

The Court examined Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which:

• Requires arbitration awards to be made within 12 months (Section 29A(1))
• Allows parties to extend this period by 6 months with mutual consent (Section 29A(3))
• Permits courts to further extend the period for "sufficient cause" (Sections 29A(4) and 29A(5))

The Court found sufficient cause existed because delays were due to:

• COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2022)
• Administrative reasons (Arbitrator's other duties as Divisional Commissioner)
• Procedural delays by NHAI (non-filing of replies despite opportunities)
• Parties participating in proceedings without objection beyond the 18-month period

Court's Reasoning

1. Protection from Prejudice:

• The petitioners had been litigating since 2016 and should not suffer due to delays not attributable to them

2. Legitimate Expectations:

• Parties had consensually participated in proceedings for years, creating legitimate expectations

3. Precedent:

• Similar extensions had been granted by coordinate benches in comparable cases

4. Legal Principles:

• Cited Supreme Court decisions (TATA Sons vs. Siva Industries and Rohan Builders vs. Berger Paints) supporting judicial discretion to extend arbitration timelines when sufficient cause exists

Judgment and Directions

1. The Court:

• Quashed and set aside the impugned orders of February 16, 2024
• Restored all arbitration reference petitions to their original position
• Directed the Arbitrator to complete proceedings and pass awards within six months
• Made costs easy for the respective parties

2. Key Legal Principles

• Courts can extend arbitration timelines even after statutory periods expire when sufficient cause exists
• Parties should not suffer due to administrative delays or circumstances beyond their control
• The principle of "Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit" (an act of the court shall prejudice no one) applies to arbitration proceedings