25 December 2024 - Legal Updates

1. Delhi High Court Directs Family Courts To Complete Witness Cross Examinations Expeditiously Without Embarrassment To Parties

The Delhi High Court has recently instructed all Family Courts in the national capital to ensure the swift completion of witness cross-examinations, without subjecting the parties to unnecessary harassment or embarrassment. A division bench, consisting of Justice Rekha Palli and Justice Saurabh Banerjee, emphasized that Family Courts must prevent counsels from asking irrelevant questions during cross-examinations, particularly those that drag on for days.

“The disputes brought before the Family Courts typically involve matters such as seeking divorce on grounds of cruelty, desertion, or custody of minor children. Therefore, it is essential that these issues are resolved promptly, as outlined in the Act,” the Court stated.

“We also expect full cooperation from all counsels representing parties before the Family Courts, as unnecessary delays in cross-examination harm the interests of both sides and go against the very essence of the Family Courts,” it further added.

The bench was hearing an appeal filed by a wife who challenged a family court order that rejected her request to have her maintenance application decided before addressing the merits of the divorce petition. Additionally, her right to cross-examine was denied due to her inability to appear for the cross-examination. The Court observed that in its eagerness to expedite the trial of an old case, the Family Court failed to recognize that family matters require a higher degree of sensitivity.

"In our view, given the present circumstances, where the appellant was not deliberately avoiding cross-examination, the Family Court should not have prematurely closed the appellant's right to examine herself," the Court stated. It further noted that the Family Court failed to consider that the appellant wife was employed in a private company and, therefore, could not be expected to take leave on demand.

“In view of the above, we are compelled to partly allow the appeal by overturning the impugned order to the extent that it denies the appellant's right to examine herself. We direct that the final arguments in the petition will not be heard until the appellant’s cross-examination is completed. The Family Court is authorized to schedule a date for this purpose, with the consent of the parties, in January,” the Court stated.

Case- X vs. Y

2. Private Party Can’t Seek Punishment For Contempt of Court Without Prior Written Consent of Advocate General: Jharkhand High Court

The Jharkhand High Court dismissed a contempt petition filed by an advocate, ruling that it was not maintainable under the Contempt of Courts Act due to the petitioner's lack of locus standi and failure to meet the necessary requirements for initiating such proceedings. Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, in his ruling, stated, “It is well established that if a private party seeks punishment for contempt of court, they can only file a petition under Section 15 of the Act with prior written consent from the Advocate General. In this case, Mr. Abhishek Krishna Gupta, Advocate, appearing in person, did not obtain such prior written consent, and as a result, he did not meet the mandatory criteria for invoking the Court's contempt jurisdiction.”

The advocate-petitioner claimed that another advocate, practicing before the High Court, had misrepresented facts to obtain an order in a previous petition. The petitioner argued that this advocate had secured an order directing the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to file a counter-affidavit in a case where the investigation had already been completed, and a charge sheet had been filed. The petitioner contended that such suppression of facts justified the initiation of contempt proceedings.

In its judgment, the Court stated, “The petitioner, appearing in person, is not a party in his personal capacity to the order against which this contempt petition has been filed. The petition has been filed in his personal capacity, whereas the order did not grant liberty to any third party to initiate contempt proceedings. Therefore, the petition filed by Mr. Abhishek Krishna Gupta is not maintainable.”

Citing precedents, the Court emphasized that the contempt power should not be used excessively or misused. It further stated that, as a general rule, contempt cannot be invoked for enforcing a decree or implementing an order when an alternative legal remedy is available.

“The discretion granted to the Court should be exercised to uphold its dignity and the authority of the law. Additionally, an aggrieved party does not have the right to demand that the Court exercise this jurisdiction, as contempt proceedings are a matter between the contemnor and the Court,” the Court concluded.

The Court, while imposing costs on the petitioner, initially ordered, “This contempt petition is dismissed with a cost of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand), to be deposited by the petitioner with the Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority (JHALSA) within four weeks.”

However, recognizing the petitioner's intention to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, the Court granted an extension, stating, “At this stage, Mr. Abhishek Krishna Gupta, Advocate appearing in person, has informed that he intends to file a Special Leave Petition (S.L.P.) before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In light of this, further time may kindly be granted to him.”

Consequently, the contempt petition was dismissed.

Case- Abhishek Krishna Gupta vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr.

3. Section 92 of CPC | Leave of Court Mandatory Prerequisite for Instituting Suit, Defect Cannot Be Cured Later: J&K High Court

The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court, reinforcing the mandatory nature of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), stated that obtaining the court's leave is a prerequisite for filing a suit under this section. A bench of Justice Javed Iqbal Wani stressed that a suit filed without prior leave is void from the outset, and this defect is fundamental and cannot be rectified later.

Section 92 of the CPC is a special provision aimed at protecting public trusts of religious and charitable nature. It allows suits to be filed by the Advocate General or by two or more individuals with an interest in the trust, but only with the court's prior permission. These suits typically seek remedies such as the removal of trustees, directions for proper administration, or the creation of management schemes for the trust.

The court's observations stemmed from a dispute concerning the Hanuman Ji Mandir Charitable Trust in Jammu. The plaintiffs, who claimed to represent the public interest, had filed a suit under Section 92 CPC, seeking declarations to annul certain trust deeds, injunctions against the defendants' management of the temple, and orders for the formulation of a new management scheme.

The petitioner, Rakesh Kumar Mahajan (defendant no. 2 in the original suit), filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, arguing that the suit was invalid because the plaintiffs had failed to obtain prior leave from the court as required by Section 92 CPC. However, the trial court rejected this argument, stating that the absence of prior leave was a mere procedural defect that could be rectified later. Dissatisfied with this decision, the petitioner approached the High Court for revision.

After reviewing the competing arguments, Justice Wani carefully examined the provisions of Section 92 CPC, its legislative intent, and relevant judicial precedents. He reaffirmed that suits under this section are of a special nature, intended to protect public trusts from unjustified harassment while also safeguarding the interests of the beneficiaries. The requirement for prior leave, he emphasized, is in place to prevent frivolous or reckless litigation.

Referencing the Supreme Court's ruling in R.M. Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar [(1991) 1 SCC 48], the court highlighted that the legislative history of Section 92 reflects its dual purpose: allowing interested parties to file suits to protect public trusts while also safeguarding trustees from frivolous lawsuits by requiring mandatory prior leave.

The court firmly stated that the requirement for prior leave is both mandatory and jurisdictional, further noting:

The court stated, “A straightforward reading of the provisions of Section 92 CPC clearly indicates that the requirements are mandatory and must be strictly followed. It specifically highlights that the court's leave is a condition precedent for filing the suit. Without such leave, a suit cannot be considered valid, meaning the leave must precede the suit, not follow it. A suit filed without the court's leave is non-existent, and this fundamental defect cannot be rectified by granting leave at a later stage.”

The court further observed that the trial court had made an error by treating the lack of prior leave as a mere procedural defect. This, the court said, amounted to an illegal exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity.

Consequently, Justice Wani allowed the revision petition, set aside the trial court's order, and accepted the petitioner's application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, resulting in the rejection of the plaint.

Case- Rakesh Kumar Mahajan vs. Sidharth Wazir and Others