25 October 2024 - Legal Updates

1. Aadhaar Card Not Suitable As Proof of Date of Birth: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court set aside a High Court’s decision to accept the date of birth mentioned in the Aadhaar Card to determine the age of the victim in a motor accident compensation case.

The bench comprising Justices Sanjay Karol and Ujjal Bhuyan was not inclined to accept the suitability of the Aadhaar card as proof of age. The court observed that instead of referring to the date of birth mentioned in the Aadhaar card for determining the age of the deceased, the age of the deceased can be more authoritatively determined from the date of birth mentioned in the school leave certificate having statutory recognition under section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

It was the case where the compensation of Rs.19,35,400/- decided by the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal (MACT) was reduced to Rs.9,22,336/- by the High Court upon noting that the MACT had wrongly applied the age multiplier while determining the compensation to deceased LRs. The High Court upon relying on the date of birth mentioned in the deceased Aadhaar Card, calculated his age as 47 years and applied the multiplier of 13.

The appellants/ Legal Representatives challenged the High Court's decision contending that the High Court erred in referring to the Aadhar Card to calculate the deceased age. They referred to the deceased's School Leave Certificate to contend that his age at the time of the incident was 45 years and accordingly multiplier of 14 would apply.

Finding force in the appellant's contention, the judgment authored by Justice Karol discussed various High Court decisions on the point of whether an Aadhar Card can serve as proof of age.

Some of the decisions discussed are as follows:

“In Manoj Kumar Yadav v. State of M.P, the MP High Court held that when it comes to establishing the age, on a plea of juvenility the age mentioned in the Aadhar Card could not be taken as a conclusive proof in view of Section 94 of the JJ Act.

In Navdeep Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors, the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that Aadhaar Cards were not “firm proof of age”.

In State of Maharashtra v. Unique Identification Authority of India And Ors., the Bombay High Court took reference to the UIDAI Circular no. 08 of 2023 stating that an Aadhaar Card, while can be used to establish identity, it is not per se proof of date of birth.

In Gopalbhai Naranbhai Vaghela v. Union Of India & Anr., the Gujarat High Court directed the release of the petitioner's pension in accordance with the date as mentioned in the School Leaving Certificate, keeping aside the difference in the date of birth as mentioned in the Aadhaar Card, which was not relevant for the purpose of such consideration.

In Shabana v. NCT of Delhi, the Delhi High Court recorded the UIDAI's statement that an “Aadhaar Card may not be used as proof of date of birth.”

The Court also noted the Unique Identification Authority of India, by way of its Circular No.08 of 2023, has stated, that an Aadhar Card, while can be used to establish identity, it is not per se proof of date of birth.

In essence, the bench was not convinced of the suitability of the Aadhaar Card as proof of age.

“That being the position, as it stands with respect to the determination of age, we have no hesitation in accepting the contention of the claimant-appellants, based on the School Leaving Certificate. Thus, we find no error in the learned MACT's determination of age based on the School Leaving Certificate.”, the court observed.

Applying a multiplier of 14 and keeping future prospects to be 25% instead of 30% as fixed by MACT, the Court upon applying the law laid down in the National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) judgment directed the respondents to pay Rs.15,00,000/- as compensation to the Appellant.

“The appeals are allowed, the total amount, i.e., Rs.14,41,500, in the interest of just compensation is rounded off to Rs.15,00,000/- with 8% interest from the date of filing of the claim petition to be released to the rightful claimants in the manner directed by the Tribunal”, the court held.

Case- Saroj & Ors. vs. IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Co. & Ors.

2. ‘Procedural Irregularity Can’t Defeat Substantive Right’: Supreme Court Sets Aside HC Order Dismissing Objections To Decree Due to Misapplication of Provisions

Observing that procedural irregularity cannot defeat substantive rights, the Supreme Court provided relief to the decree objector whose objection plea was refused by the High Court on the grounds of  misapplication of the provisions in filing his objection towards execution of the decree.

The case relates to the ascertainment of the right in a suit property where the first partition suit recognized the decree objector/appellant’s right in a suit. Further, a second partition suit was filed also recognizing the respondent’s right in a suit property. The dispute was related to the second partition suit where the decree passed in respondent’s favour recognizing his right in the suit property when the appellant’s right was already recognized was objected by the appellant by filing an application under section 47 and Order XXI Rule 58 and 97 of Civil Procedure Code (CPC).

The High Court refused to allow the appellant's civil revision against the First Appellate Court's order. The High Court reasoned that an application objecting to the decree cannot be entertained on the grounds of misapplication of the law.

Setting aside the High Court's decision, the bench comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and Sanjay Karol observed that irrespective of the fact that the appellant had misapplied the provision while objecting to the decree, he can't be denied his substantive right in a suit property because of the rights accrued to him by virtue of first partition suit.

“The ground taken by the High Court to dismiss the revision application is that the appellant herein misapplied the provisions in filing his objections before the executing court, inasmuch as the objection petition mentioned both Section 47 as also Order XXI Rule 58 and 97 of the CPC. The High Court found that both these sets of provisions could not be applied together given that the method of assailing the orders passed therein are different and cannot co-exist. Whilst looking at it purely from a procedural point of view, this may have some merit; however, as has been long established, procedural irregularity cannot defeat substantive rights or cannot subvert substantive justice. Since the objector or his father already had a decree in their favour, fruits thereof cannot be denied to them by virtue of the fact that while attempting to protect their rights in a subsequent suit which would have affected their enjoyment of such property, the Sections or Orders under which they sought such protection, were incorrect.”, the judgment authored by Justice Karol said.

In essence, the court said that the party in whose favor a substantial right has been generated cannot be denied the enjoyment of the right because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence, or even infraction of the rules of procedure.

The Court observed that when the appellant's right in the suit property attained finality by virtue of the first partition suit then the decree passed in the second partition suit recognizing the right of the respondent must necessarily exclude the portions which already stand decreed per the first partition suit.

Since it was unclear from the record that the portion of Khasra No. 2259 recognizing the right of the respondent in a second partition suit was the same piece of land granted to the appellants, therefore the court rather than deciding itself the objection taken by the appellants deemed it fit to refer the matter to the First Appellate Court to take a decision on the objections of the appellant afresh, on merits.

Case- Joginder Singh (Dead) Thr LRs vs. Dr. Virinderjit Singh Gill (Dead) Thr. LRs and Ors.

3. Order Granting Leave Under Section 92 CPC is Judicial Order And Amenable To Revisional Jurisdiction: Madras High Court

The Madras High Court has recently observed that an order granting leave under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code is a judicial order and not an administrative order. The court added that being a judicial order, it was also amenable to revisional jurisdiction of courts. The court thus took a different stand than what had been previously taken by the Madras High Court.

“I have respectfully taken a contra stand and hold that the order granting leave under section 92 of CPC is a judicial order and not an administrative order that it is amenable to revisional jurisdiction,” the court said.

Justice GR Swaminathan observed that the power of the court to grant leave under section 92 was judicial as it was wielded by a Civil Court and the court had to exercise its discretion on objective grounds as the matter involved rights of parties.

“One can easily conclude that the power under section 92 of CPC is judicial and not administrative. Firstly, the power is wielded by the Civil court. Obviously, there is a lis involved. Secondly, the civil court has to exercise its discretion on objective grounds as the manner involves the rights of parties,” the court said.

As per Section 92 CPC, in case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate General or two or more persons having interest in the trust and having obtained the leave of court may institute a suit.

In the present case, the court was hearing a civil revision petition challenging an order passed by the Principal District Judge, Thanjavur in an interlocutory application granting leave to persons to institute a suit for settling a scheme for administration of the Madha Trust.

The revision petitioners submitted that the IA could not have been allowed without impleading the Madha Trust and secondly, except from making averments, the applicants had failed to show how they were interest in the Trust.

The respondents (original applicants) however, argued that the civil revision petition was not maintainable and hence the court could not interfere in the same. It was pointed out that in a catena of judgments the Madras High Court had held that an order granting leave under Section 92 of CPC was merely an administrative order and not a judicial order and therefore it was not amenable to challenge in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC or Article 227 of the Constitution.

The court noted that in the case of GR Govindarajulu & Sons Charities, & 2 others Vs. V.R.Sethurao and 12 Others, the Madras High Court had held that the order of granting leave, though was exercised by the court, it was not by a court of law as the court was discharging its administrative functions and not a judicial or quasi-judicial function. The court further noted that this view had been followed by the Madras High Court in its later judgments.

The court, however, also noted that three other High Courts had taken a different view than what was held in Govindrajulu's case. The court noted that in the case of Church of South India Vs. John, the Kerala High Court had observed that to say the order allowing or declining leave under Section 92 is an administrative order, not amenable to judicial review was per se wrong. Further the Karnataka High Court, in the case of Srimad Ujjaini Saddharma Vs.Sri S S Patil also dissented from the Govindrajulu case and held that the revision was maintainable. Similarly, in Kalinga Institute of Mining Engineering and Technology Trust (KIMET), Chhendipada, Angul and Ors. Vs. Bipin Bihari Behera and Ors, the Orissa High Court had held that an order passed under Section 92(1) of the CPC was a judicial order.

The court also noted that a 7-judge bench of the Supreme Court in the case of SBP & Co Vs Patel EngineeringLimited (2005) had distinguished between an administrative order and a judicial order. The court noted that when the discretion of the court would involve purely subjective consideration, it was an administrative order and when the discretion was objective, it was a judicial order.

“An administrative order would be one which is directed to the regulation or supervision of matters as distinguished from an order which decides the rights of parties or confers or refuses to confer rights to property which are the subject of adjudication before the Court. It was categorically held that in the case of an administrative order, the discretion would involve purely subjective consideration. If the discretion has to be exercised based on objective considerations, it would be a judicial decision,” the court noted.

Applying this approach, the court concluded that an order under Section 92 is also a judicial order as the court exercises its discretion on objective ground on a lis between parties. The court also noted that unless an aggrieved person was allowed to challenge the order of granting leave by a revision petition, the fundamental error that may be committed by the court could not be corrected.

The court thus concluded that the Trust was a necessary party in the proceedings and in the present case, Madha trust was not impleaded. The court also noted that the District Judge had failed to note that the affidavit filed in support of the IA seeking leave was bald and did not set out the interest of the persons to maintain the suit.

Noting that the power of the court under Article 227 was to correct egregious errors committed by courts below, the court allowed the revision petition and set aside the order of the District Judge.

Case- Rev. Fr. Savarimuthu and others vs. V.S. Jeyapandi