27 May 2025 Legal Updates

IF ARREST IS MADE ON WARRANT, NO SEPARATE GROUNDS OF ARREST NEED TO BE GIVEN: SUPREME COURT

(a) Case Title:

• Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. 

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India 

(c) Date of Decisions 

• May 23, 2025 

(d) Bench:

• Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan 

KEY FACTS:

The appellant filed a writ of habeas corpus challenging the illegal arrest and detention of his son, Kessireddy Raja Shekhar Reddy, by the CID under Sections 420 (cheating), 409 (criminal breach of trust), and 120-B (criminal conspiracy) IPC (now under BNS, 2023).  The son was arrested on 21.04.2025 at Hyderabad Airport. Grounds of arrest were provided at the time of arrest, but the appellant argued they were vague and non-compliant with Article 22 of the Constitution and Sections 47 & 48 of BNSS (Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the arrest's legality. 

Supreme Court Analysis:

The Supreme Court focused on whether the grounds of arrest were meaningful and sufficient under Article 22(1).  The SC relied on the landmark judgment Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana (2025), which mandates that grounds of arrest must be: 

• Clear and specific (not just legal provisions). 
• Communicated effectively to the arrestee in a language they understand. 
• Provided "as soon as may be" to enable legal recourse. 

Legal Principles Discussed:

1. Article 21 Constitution:

• Right to life and personal liberty. 

2. Article 22(1) Constitution:

• Arrested persons must be informed of grounds of arrest and allowed legal representation. 

3. Section 47 BNSS:

• Requires police to communicate "full particulars of the offence" to the arrestee.

4. Section 48 BNSS:

• Obligation to inform relatives/friends about the arrest. 

Precedents Cited:

1. Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana (2025):

• Grounds of arrest must be meaningful and not merely procedural. 

2. Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2024):

• Written Grounds are ideal for transparency.

3. State of Bombay v. Atma Ram (1951):

• Grounds must enable the arrestee to understand accusations. 

Supreme Court's Decision:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that: 

• The grounds of arrest were sufficiently detailed (listed specific allegations like conspiracy, kickbacks, and wrongful gains).  Consequently, there was compliance with Article 22(1) and BNSS was satisfied. 

AIR FORCE SCHOOL NOT A 'STATE' UNDER ARTICLE 12; TEACHERS' WRIT PETITIONS AGAINST DISMISSALS NOT MAINTAINABLE: SUPREME COURT

(a) Case Title:

• Dileep Kumar Pandey v. Union of India & Ors; Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. Central Board of Secondary Education & Ors.

(b) Court: 

• Supreme Court of India 

(c) Date of Decision: 

• May 21, 2025 

(d) Bench: 

• Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Augustine George Masih  and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah 

Facts:

The appellants, Dileep Kumar Pandey (Physical Education Teacher) and Sanjay Kumar Sharma (Commerce Teacher), were terminated/disciplinary action was taken against them by the Air Force School, Bamrauli.  They filed writ petitions before the Allahabad High Court, arguing that the school is a "State" under Article 12 due to deep control by the Indian Air Force (IAF) and public funding.  The Single Judge held the school as a "State," but the Division Bench reversed this, stating it was a private institution. The matter reached the Supreme Court. 

Key Issues:

• Whether the Air Force School, Bamrauli (managed by the Indian Air Force Educational and Cultural Society) qualifies as a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 
• Whether the school is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for service disputes of its employees. 

Majority Judgment (Justice Oka & Justice Masih):

Two judges from the bench held that the School is NOT a "State" under Article 12 on the following grounds: 

• The IAF Educational and Cultural Society (managing the school) is a private society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. 
• No statutory control or direct government funding was proven. 
• Pay scales and infrastructure being regulated by IAF does not mean pervasive control. 
• Non-Public Funds (Regimental Funds) used for the school are not government funds. 

Writ Petition Not Maintainable:

• The dispute is a private contractual matter between the teachers and the school. 
• No public law element involved in termination/disciplinary actions. 

Dissenting Judgement:

• The third judge of the Bench held that a School is amenable to Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 on the following grounds: 
• The school performs a public function (imparting education). 
• Deep and pervasive control by IAF officers (School Managing Committee consists of IAF personnel). 
• Funding includes public money (IAF funds, tax exemptions, land allocation). 
• Teachers are integral to education, so their service conditions have a public law element.

With these observations the judge opined that the appeals should be allowed and the High Court should decide the writ petitions on merits 

FINAL JUDGMENT

With 2:1 majority, the Appeals were dismissed; writ petitions not maintainable. 

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Article 12 ("State") vs. Article 226 (Writ Jurisdiction): 

• Even if an institution is not a "State" under Article 12, it may still be subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 if it performs public functions. 

2. Tests for "State" under Article 12: 

• Financial, functional, and administrative control by the government. 
• Statutory backing vs. private society registration. 

3. Public Function Doctrine: 

• Imparting education is a public duty, but service disputes may still be private contractual matters. 

UNSOUNDNESS OF MIND VS. MENTAL RETARDATION: DELHI HIGH COURT EXPLAINS MEDICAL AND LEGAL DIFFERENCES

(a) Case Title:

• State v. Neeraj 

(b) Court:

• High Court of Delhi at New Delhi 

(c) Date of Decision: 

• April 21, 2025 

(d) Bench: 

• Dr. Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma 

FACTS: 

Accused (Neeraj), diagnosed with severe mental retardation (mental age of a 4-year-old), was charged under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 POCSO Act for attempting to sexually assault a minor.  The Sessions Court discharged him based on a medical report from IHBAS, stating he was incapable of understanding the proceedings or defending himself.  The State challenged the discharge, arguing the court failed to follow mandatory safeguards under Sections 328–330 Cr.P.C., particularly: 

• No inquiry into the nature of the alleged act. 
• No assessment of whether the accused could be safely released or needed institutional care under Section 330(3).

Key Issues:

• Whether the Sessions Court followed the mandatory procedure under Chapter XXV of Cr.P.C. (Sections 328–330) while discharging an accused with severe mental retardation in a POCSO case. 
• Whether the discharge order was legally sustainable without assessing the nature of the alleged act and ensuring public safety under Section 330(3) of Cr.P.C. 

Key Legal Provisions:

1. Chapter XXV Cr.P.C. (Sections 328–330): 

• Section 328: Inquiry into mental condition pre-trial (before framing charges). 
• Section 329: Procedure if unsoundness is discovered during trial. 
• Section 330: Safeguards for release/detention of accused with mental illness/retardation. 

2. Distinction:

• Unsoundness of mind (treatable, episodic) vs. Mental retardation (permanent, developmental). 
• Section 84 IPC (insanity defense) applies only to unsoundness of mind, not mental retardation. 

High Court Analysis:

1. Procedural Lapses by Sessions Court: 

• The court correctly initiated inquiry under Section 328(1) by referring the accused to a medical board (IHBAS). 

However, it failed to comply with Section 330(3):  

• Did not assess the nature of the alleged act (severity of sexual assault attempt). 
• Did not determine if the accused could be safely released (with safeguards) or needed institutional care. 
• Merely directed a surety bond of ₹10,000 without further safeguards. 

2. Mandatory Nature of Chapter XXV: 

• The provisions use "shall", making compliance mandatory. 
• The law balances compassion for the accused (no trial if incapable) with public safety (risk of repeat offenses). 

FINAL JUDGMENT

The discharge order was set aside. The case was sent back to the Sessions Court to pass a fresh order complying with Section 330(3). 

Key Takeaways:

1. Procedure for Mentally Ill/Retarded Accused: 

• Pre-trial (Section 328): Magistrate must order medical examination and decide incapacity. 
• Post-finding (Section 330): Court must assess:  Safety of release (with sureties) and Need for institutionalization (if risk to society). 

2. Mental Retardation IS NOT the same as Unsoundness of Mind: 

• There is no defense under Section 84 IPC for mental retardation but trial cannot proceed if accused cannot understand proceedings.

3. Judicial Duty:

• Courts must strictly follow statutory safeguards to protect both the accused and society.