27 September 2024 - Legal Updates

1. Abuse of Criminal Process, Vague Allegations: Supreme Court Quashes Wife’s Sec. 498 Case Against In-Laws

Observing that a criminal case cannot be allowed to proceed based on vague and obscure complaints; the Supreme Court quashed a criminal case under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code case against the in-laws of a complaint wife.

It was a case where the wife had initiated the proceedings against the appellants under sections 498A, 323, 504 and 506 read with section 34 IPC against the appellants. The complaint was against the step mother-in-law, step brother-in-law. Father-in-law and other individual.

She had levelled various allegations against the appellants such as cruelty or harassment, threatening to deprive her of the property, etc. however, the allegations in the FIR were general and omnibus in nature and lacked material particulars bereft of any details, rendering the complaint vague and obscure.

The High Court has refused to quash the criminal case against the appellants citing held that a prima facie case of cruelty is made out under section 498A.

Setting aside the High Court's order, the bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and Pankaj Mithal observed that the criminal proceedings were instituted with a mala fide intention, only to harass the appellants.

Discussing various allegations levelled by the complainants against the appellants, the judgment authored by Justice Narasimha noted that there was no truthfulness in the allegations as it is impossible to conceive of any offence based on such vague and unclear allegations.

In essence, the court said that it would be unjustified to register a criminal case based on omnibus statements or vague allegations as it would cause injustice to the party.

Reference was made to Mohammad Wajid and Another v. State of U.P 2023 which highlighted the duty of the High Court to examine the allegations with care and caution when the allegations are manifestly vexatious and malicious.

Noting that the husband has not been made an accused, the Court observed:

"The FIR in this case is rather unique, in as much as the complainant has chosen not to involve her husband in the criminal proceedings, particularly when all the allegations relate to demand of dowry. It appears that the complainant and her husband have distributed amongst themselves, the institution of civil and criminal proceedings against the appellants. While the husband institutes the civil suit, his wife, the complainant has chosen to initiate criminal proceedings. Interestingly, there is no reference of one proceeding in the other."

The Court was of the view that the Complaint/FIR is intended only to further their interest of the civil dispute.

Reference was also made to Jaswant Singh vs State of Punjab (2021) which held that the Court has a duty to scrutinize the matter when FIR has predominating and overwhelming civil favour. The decision in Usha Chakraborty v. State of W.B (2023) was also cited where the Court quashed criminal proceedings due to general, vague, and omnibus allegations. The decision in Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar which held that it would be an injustice to subject the in-laws to criminal proceedings based on general and vague allegations was also referred to.

Taking note of an identical matter where the trial court had dismissed the domestic violence complaint of the complainant, the court observed as follows:

“We are not referring to all the findings of the Court dismissing the domestic violence complaint. It is sufficient to note that identical allegations were examined in detail, subjected to strict scrutiny, and rejected as being false and untenable. This case is yet another instance of abuse of criminal process and it would not be fair and just to subject the appellants to the entire criminal law process.”

Since no case was made out in the complaint therefore the court deemed it appropriate to quash the pending criminal case against the appellants. In this regard, the court referred to the recent case of Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, where it warned against the mechanical registration of domestic violence cases against the in-laws and husband.

Case- Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr.

2. Sec 464 CrPC | Conviction Can’t be Challenged Based On Conversion of Charges unless ‘Failure of Justice’ is proved: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court observed that to challenge the conviction based on alteration of charges, the accused must demonstrate that substantial ‘failure of justice’ is caused to them by such conversion of charges.

The court held so while upholding the conviction of the appellants in a murder case where they were initially charged under section 302 read with section 149 IPC 9Common object) but convicted under section 302 read with section 34 of IPC (Common intention).

The appellants assailed their conviction on the ground that the High Court did not dwell upon the distinction between common object and common intention while converting the appellants’ conviction under section 302 IPC read with section 149 IPC to section 302 IPC read with section 34 IPC.

Affirming the decision of the High Court, the bench comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih approved the conviction based on the conversion of the charges from Section 302 r/w Section 149 IPC to Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC, and observed that the determination of common intention or common object should primarily be within the domain of the trial courts, and at the most the high courts because of their overlapping nature, and added it is not the Supreme Court's role to adjudicate issues of common intention and common object directly.

Further, the court referred to Section 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) to state that the appellant cannot challenge their conviction solely on the ground of conversion of charges. The Court added that only if the appellants prove that the conversion of charges caused a 'failure of justice' than only they would be entitled to relief.

Section 464 (1) of Cr.P.C. states that no sentence, findings, or order by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in an appeal, confirmation or revision, a claim of "failure of justice" has been substantiated.

The Court noted that since the appellants were aware of the charges made against them and got a fair chance to defend themselves in the trial, therefore it could not be said that failure of justice was caused to the appellants warranting overturning of conviction.

"Law is well-settled that in order to judge whether a failure of justice has been occasioned, it will be relevant to examine whether the accused was aware of the basic ingredients of the offence for which he is being convicted and whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him clearly and whether he got a fair chance to defend himself."

“We have no hesitation to hold that based on the above parameters, the appellants have fairly and squarely failed in their pursuit to demonstrate any failure of justice, which would impel us to exercise power of the nature contemplated in sub-section (2) of section 464, Cr. PC. We, therefore, see no reason to uphold the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants to the contrary”, the judgment authored by Justice Dipankar Datta added.

Case- Baljinder Singh & Others vs. State of Punjab

3. Power of Courts to Substitute Arbitrator Under Section 29A(6) Essentially to Further Intent of Section 29A: Delhi High Court

The Delhi High Court bench of Justice C. Hari Shankar, while hearing a petition filed under section 29A (4) and (6) pertaining to substitute the arbitrator is there to further the purpose of Section 29A.

Section 29A (6) confers power on a court to substitute one or all of the arbitrators while extending the arbitral tribunal’s mandate.

Facts-

A petition has been filed under Section 29A (4) and (6) of the Arbitration Act, seeking an extension of the arbitrator's mandate. Additionally, the petition has sought to substitute the arbitrator under Section 29A (6) of the Act.

Submissions by the Parties:

The respondent made the following submissions:

• In the present case, no justifiable reason exists for substituting the arbitrator.
• Placing reliance on a coordinate bench judgment in NCC Ltd v. UOI, where in para 11 it was held that the 2015 amendment introduced Section 29A, and the provision is not intended for a party to seek substitution of an arbitrator solely on the ground that the party has apprehension about the conduct of the arbitrator. The only ground for the removal of the arbitrator is the failure of the arbitrator to proceed expeditiously in the arbitral proceedings.

The petitioner made the following submissions:

• Under Section 29A (6), the court has absolute power to substitute the arbitrator while extending the mandate. As there are no guidelines or criteria in Section 29A (6), the court can act ex debito justiciae and substitute the arbitrator if reasonable grounds are being made out.
• The arbitrator had allowed the respondent to cross-examine the petitioner's witness for over eight hearings. The respondent should not have been granted such liberty in cross-examination.
• The observations of the Coordinate Bench in NCC have to be construed in the light of the facts of that case.

Analysis of the Court:

The Bench observed that Section 29A (6) has to be read in the context of Section 29A. Section 29A pertains to the extension of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal. Sub-section (6), when read in context, indicates that the substitution of the arbitrator is to be undertaken only when the court believes that the proceedings are being unduly delayed by the arbitrator. The intent of Sub-section (6) is to ensure that the exercise of discretion by the court when extending the mandate of the tribunal is not frustrated by an arbitrator who, without any justifiable reason, is delaying the proceedings.

In clear terms, the Coordinate Bench in NCC held that the substitution of an arbitrator under Section 29A is effected when the existing arbitrator fails to proceed expeditiously in the matter. The intent of conferring power on a court in Sub-section (6) to substitute the arbitrator is to further the intent of Section 29A, i.e. to enable the proceedings to conclude. Therefore, in agreement with the Coordinate Bench in NCC, Section 29A (6) would only apply where the existing arbitrator was unjustifiably stretching the proceedings.

The Bench further held that the arbitrator cannot be said to have failed to proceed with reasonable expedition. The extent to which a party is allowed to cross-examine a witness is the arbitrator's sole discretion. If the cross-examination continues for a prolonged period, the court can pass remedial orders. However, in the present case, eight hearings cannot be treated as a case fit for the court to substitute the arbitrator on the grounds under Section 29A (6).

The substitution of an arbitrator is an extreme measure and cannot be pursued at the drop of a hat. Otherwise, no arbitration would proceed to the conclusion. Only when a clear and substantial case for substitution is made out can the court use the power conferred under Section 29A(6) to substitute an arbitrator.

Therefore, the Bench partly allowed the petition by extending the tribunal's mandate but rejected the prayer seeking substitution of the arbitrator.

Case- Poonam Mittal vs. Creat Ed Pvt. Ltd.