5 August 2025 Legal Updates

Certificate Issued By School Without Supporting Proof Not Enough Evidence To Determine Kidnapping Victim's Age: Rajasthan High Court

(a) Court:

• High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur

(b) Case Number:

• S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 34/2007 and S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 422/2007

Facts of the Case

(a) Complainant:

• Raisuddin, father of the victim "S"

(b) Accused:

• Nadeem, resident of Balodi Fatehpur, Sikar

(c) Incident:

• On April 13, 2005, complainant Raisuddin filed a report alleging that accused Nadeem had taken away his daughter "S" for the purpose of marrying her. The victim was subsequently recovered, and the accused was arrested. After investigation, a chargesheet was filed for offenses under Sections 363 (kidnapping), 366 (kidnapping woman to compel marriage), and 376 (rape) IPC. The Additional Session Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Jodhpur acquitted the accused on November 15, 2006, leading to both a revision petition by the complainant and an appeal by the State challenging the acquittal.

Key Legal Issues

• Age Determination: Whether the victim was a minor at the time of the incident
• Credibility of Evidence: Reliability of school certificates and medical ossification tests for age proof
• Consent and Voluntariness: Whether the victim went voluntarily with the accused
• Standard in Acquittal Appeals: The threshold for appellate courts to interfere with acquittal judgments

Court's Observations

Justice Farjand Ali made several critical observations regarding evidence evaluation:

1. On School Certificate:

• The court noted that the certificate from Anjuman Muslim Girls Secondary School, Sikar was inadmissible as the prosecution failed to produce underlying records like admission forms, scholar registers, or examine school officials. The father admitted he was unaware of his daughter's date of birth before filing the police report.

2. On Medical Evidence:

• The ossification test report from SN Medical College and MG Hospital, Jodhpur indicated the victim was above 15 years and below 17 years, but the court emphasized that such tests are mere estimates with a variation of ±2 years and cannot provide definitive age determination.

3. On Victim's Statement:

• The court found significant contradictions between the victim's initial statement to PW-12 Pujraj Singh, her statement under Section 164 CrPC,, and her trial testimony, indicating she was a consenting party.

Court Directions

The Rajasthan High Court dismissed both the revision petition and the criminal appeal, affirming the trial court's acquittal judgment. The court held that no material of impeccable quality or clinching evidence existed to establish that the victim was below 18 years at the relevant time. It concluded that the victim left her parents' company voluntarily and joined the accused of her own free will, ruling out offenses under Sections 363 and 366 IPC. Regarding the rape charge under Section 376 IPC, the court found the evidence, particularly the victim's testimony, did not inspire confidence to hold the accused guilty. The court emphasized that appellate courts should show reluctance in interfering with acquittal judgments unless there is total non-consideration of material evidence, and when two views are possible, the one favorable to the accused should be preferred.

Legal Significance

This judgment establishes important precedents regarding age determination in criminal cases and the evidentiary standards required. It reinforces that school certificates cannot be relied upon without proper verification of underlying records, and that only registers maintained by public schools under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act are admissible as relevant facts. The case also reaffirms the high threshold for overturning acquittal judgments, emphasizing that appellate courts should be circumspect in interfering with trial court findings unless there is clear mis-appreciation of evidence or erroneous interpretation of law, citing the Supreme Court's guidance in Mallappa v. State of Karnataka (2024) 3 SCC 544.

Supreme Court Doubts View That 'No-Fault' Liability u/s163A Motor Vehicles Act Is Only For Third Party Risks; Refers To Larger Bench

(a) Court:

• Supreme Court of India

(b) Case Number:

• Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 15447-48 of 2024

Facts of the Case

(a) Petitioner:

• Wakia Afrin (minor, represented by her aunt)

(b) Respondent:

• M/s National Insurance Co. Ltd.

(c) Deceased:

• Both parents of the petitioner

(d) Incident:

• A tragic motor vehicle accident occurred when the vehicle, owned and driven by the petitioner's father, went out of control due to a tire burst and dashed against a roadside building. Four persons traveling in the vehicle died in the accident, including both parents of the two-year-old petitioner. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Cuttack awarded compensation of Rs. 4,08,000/- for the mother's death and Rs. 4,53,339/- for the father's death under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The High Court, however, found the claim petitions not maintainable on the ground that a dead person cannot be made a defendant, despite acknowledging the validity of the insurance policy and that the vehicle was driven by a person holding a valid license.

Key Legal Issues

• Maintainability: Whether claims can survive after the death of the insured owner
• Section 163A Scope: Whether no-fault liability covers owner-drivers or is limited to third parties
• Insurance Coverage: Distinction between third-party coverage and owner-driver coverage
• Legal Heir Rights: Whether the sole heir can simultaneously have liability and claim compensation

Court's Observations

Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and K. Vinod Chandran made several critical observations challenging existing precedents:

1) On Maintainability:

• The court clarified that Section 155 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that even if the insured dies after an event giving rise to a claim, it shall not bar the survival of any cause of action against the insurer. The High Court's reasoning was found untenable as third-party claims would survive against the deceased's estate, which the insurer has an obligation to indemnify.

2. On Section 163A Interpretation:

• The court noted that Section 163A contains a non-obstante clause that overrides not only the entire Motor Vehicles Act but also any other law and any instrument having the force of law, including insurance policies. This superseding effect should extend over insurance laws and policy terms.

3. On Existing Precedents:

• The court analyzed multiple decisions including Dhanraj v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajni Devi, and others, noting considerable variance in observations but finding that as a principle, statutory liability was held not applicable to owner/insured cases since coverage was confined to third-party risks.

4. On Legislative Intent:

• The court emphasized that Section 163A was introduced as a social security scheme considering the enhanced chances of accidents and the difficulty in proving negligence, representing a beneficial piece of legislation for comprehensive 'no-fault' liability.

Court Directions

The Supreme Court expressed disagreement with the existing precedent that restricts Section 163A claims to third-party risks only. The court held that the claim regarding the mother's death should be admitted and the tribunal's award restored. However, recognizing the need for an authoritative pronouncement on whether Section 163A covers owner-drivers, the court directed the Registry to place the matter before the Chief Justice of India for reference to a larger bench. The court noted that while Section 163A appears under the chapter titled 'Insurance of Vehicles Against Third Party Risks', the non-obstante clause suppresses the entire Act, other laws, and any valid legal instruments.

Legal Significance

This case marks a potential paradigm shift in motor vehicle insurance law interpretation. The Supreme Court has questioned the long-standing interpretation that Section 163A is limited to third-party claims, suggesting that the non-obstante clause should give it broader application including owner-drivers. The reference to a larger bench indicates that the court recognizes the need to resolve conflicting precedents from various two-judge benches. This could significantly impact motor accident compensation law by potentially extending no-fault liability benefits to vehicle owners and their families, representing a more comprehensive social security approach to motor vehicle accidents. The case also clarifies the application of Section 155 regarding claim survival after the insured's death, ensuring that valid insurance policies cannot escape liability merely due to the policy holder's demise in the accident.

Promise To Marriage & Subsequent Relationship Based On Consent Won't Amount To Rape : Supreme Court Quashes POCSO Case

(a) Case Title:

• Kunal Chatterjee v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.

(b) Case Citation:

• Criminal Appeal arising from Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7004/2025

(c) Date of Judgment:

• July 29, 2025

Bench:

• Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Aravind Kumar

Court:

• Supreme Court of India, Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction

Facts

The appellant Kunal Chatterjee was accused in a case involving allegations of rape and criminal intimidation. The complainant, who was a major at the time of filing the FIR, alleged that she had been in a consensual relationship with the appellant when she was 15 years old, which was over three years prior to the complaint. The relationship was allegedly based on the appellant's promise of marriage. After the complainant attained majority, the appellant backed out from his promise to marry her, and she was subsequently humiliated by the appellant's parents. Feeling aggrieved, the complainant filed an FIR not only against the appellant but also against his father, mother, and uncle. The prosecution's case was that since the complainant was a minor at the time of the alleged physical relationship, despite her consent given on the promise of marriage, it constituted rape of a child under the POCSO Act.

Key Issues

The primary legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether a consensual physical relationship between parties, where one was a minor, based on a promise of marriage, would constitute rape under the Indian Penal Code and the POCSO Act. The Court also had to determine whether the significant delay in filing the FIR (over three years) and the absence of corroborative evidence would render the criminal proceedings an abuse of the process of law. Additionally, the Court considered whether the High Court was justified in keeping the proceedings alive against the appellant while quashing them against his family members.

Legal Provisions

The case involved charges under Sections 417 (cheating), 376 (rape), and 506 (criminal intimidation) read with Section 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. The appellant had invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for quashing the FIR.

Held

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed all proceedings against the appellant. The Court held that there was absolutely no evidence, particularly no forensic evidence, of rape being committed when the complainant was a minor. The allegation was made only in the FIR filed after more than three years, seemingly to invoke the POCSO Act. The Court noted that the complainant had categorically stated that she consented to the relationship due to the appellant's promise of marriage. Relying on established precedents, the Court reiterated that a promise of marriage followed by consensual physical relationship does not constitute rape. The Court concluded that the long delay in filing the FIR, combined with the lack of credible evidence, rendered the criminal proceedings nothing but an abuse of the process of law.

Legal Significance

This judgment carries substantial legal significance as it reinforces the established judicial principle that consensual relationships based on promises of marriage cannot be retrospectively characterized as rape. The decision emphasizes the critical importance of timely complaint filing and the presence of credible evidence in cases under the POCSO Act. It demonstrates the judiciary's commitment to preventing the misuse of criminal law to settle personal grievances arising from failed relationships. The judgment also highlights the courts' readiness to invoke their inherent powers to quash proceedings that constitute an abuse of legal process.