6 January 2025 - Legal Updates

1. Chargesheet Cannot Be Based On Bald Assertions Of Connivance: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court recently ruled that charges in a chargesheet cannot be based on mere allegations of connivance; there must be substantial evidence to support them. A bench comprising Justices C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol also stated that if prima facie intent is lacking for one offence in a given transaction, it should be considered absent for the other offences as well. These remarks were made in a judgment delivered in an appeal against the Madhya Pradesh High Court's order dated April 28, 2017, which had declined to quash a First Information Report (FIR) under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 528 of BNSS).

The charges in the chargesheet include offences under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, [Sections 319, 318, 338, 336, 340 and 62 read with section 3(5) of BNS] against five individuals for forging the Power of Attorney and registering property in their name. One of the accused, Dinesh Kumar, an official of the Housing Board, filed a petition in the High Court to quash the FIR. He argued that his role in executing the sale deed was part of his official duties, and he was protected under Section 83 of the Madhya Pradesh Girha Nirman Mandal Adhiniyam, 1972, which is similar to Section 197 of the CrPC (Section 218 of BNSS).

Supreme Court’s Observation-

The Supreme Court referred to several judgments interpreting Section 197, including Manohar Nath Kaul v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (1983), Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of U.P. (1997), and A. Sreenivasa Reddy v. Rakesh Sharma (2023). These rulings state that a public servant can only be prosecuted if the offence is directly connected to their official duties and requires sanction for prosecution. However, if the act is part of their official duties, they are protected under Section 197 of the CrPC. The Court noted that the appellant's actions would be covered by Section 83 of the Madhya Pradesh Girha Nirman Mandal Adhiniyam, 1972. It also observed that there was no evidence suggesting the appellant acted in dereliction of duty, and criticized the High Court's refusal to quash the criminal proceedings.

The Court examined whether the elements of the offence of Cheating were present in the case. Referring to Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of W.B (2022), it highlighted that to prove cheating in property delivery; the following conditions must be met: the representation was false; the accused knew it was false, the representation was made with dishonest intent to deceive, and it induced the person to act or abstain from something they otherwise wouldn't. The Court found no evidence, even prima facie, that any of these elements applied to the appellant. It concluded that there was no indication of intent to defraud related to the allegedly forged Power of Attorney.

The Court made a similar observation regarding the requirements of Section 120B, referencing Bilal Hajar v. State (2019), which stated that for a conspiracy to be established, there must be a meeting of minds between two or more persons to commit an illegal act or use illegal means. The Court concluded that there was no evidence to suggest the appellant had any knowledge or information about the forged Power of Attorney. It also held that if intent is absent for one offence in a transaction, it is presumed to be absent for other offences, such as Sections 467 and 468. With no intent attributed to the appellant, no criminal offence could be established. Citing State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), which outlines the criteria for quashing an FIR when it does not prima facie constitute an offence, the Court set aside the Madhya Pradesh High Court's judgment.

Case- Dinesh Kumar Mathur vs. State of M.P. & Anr

2. Dismissal of Earlier Section 482 CrPC Petition Doesn’t Bar Subsequent Petition Filed Due To Change in Law: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court recently ruled that the principle of res judicata does not strictly apply to criminal proceedings. It stated that the dismissal of a previous petition does not prevent the filing of a subsequent petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, (Section 528 of BNSS) especially if it is based on a change in the law. The Court also rejected the argument that a subsequent petition is not maintainable if the earlier petition was withdrawn without permission to reapply.

The Supreme Court ruled that if an earlier petition was dismissed as withdrawn without permission to reapply, the litigant does not need to seek the leave of the judge who dismissed it before filing a subsequent petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. This decision came during an appeal against the Punjab & Haryana High Court's dismissal of a subsequent petition, which was filed after the earlier petition was withdrawn. The appellants, convicted in a cheque bounce case, were required by the Sessions Court to deposit 20% of the compensation for sentence suspension. They filed a Section 482 petition against this decision, but their counsel withdrew the petition due to a binding Supreme Court ruling in Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S. S. Deswal vs Virender Gandhi (2019) that made the deposit condition mandatory under Section 148 of the N.I. Act.

Following the withdrawal of the appellants' earlier petition, the Supreme Court's decision in Jamboo Bhandari v. Madhya Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (2023) emerged. The Court in that case made an exception, allowing a condition for the deposit of 20% to be waived if it was deemed unjust or if imposing such a condition would deprive the appellant of their right to appeal. Based on this decision, the appellants filed a fresh petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., but the High Court dismissed it, citing that the earlier petition had been withdrawn without permission to reapply, and thus the subsequent petition was not maintainable.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision, stating that it was wrong to dismiss the subsequent petition simply because the appellants had withdrawn the earlier petition without obtaining permission to reapply. The Court emphasized that the principle of res judicata, which applies under Section 11 of the CPC, does not apply to criminal proceedings, and there is no equivalent provision in the Cr.P.C. to Order XXIII Rule 1(3) of the CPC. Referring to Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of U.P. (2023), the Court clarified that there is no blanket ban on filing successive petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court. Such petitions should be considered based on any changes in facts or circumstances that justify filing them. 

The Court stated that a change in law can be considered a significant change in circumstances, granting the High Court the authority to entertain a subsequent petition, even if the earlier petition was withdrawn without permission. This is subject to the High Court's satisfaction that the order sought in the new petition is necessary to prevent abuse of court processes or to ensure justice. The Court rejected the High Court's view that the appellants needed the judge's leave to file a subsequent petition, emphasizing that the appellants approached the High Court again only after the change in the interpretation of Section 148 of the N.I. Act in Jamboo Bhandari, not for any other reasons.

The Court criticized the High Court for requiring the appellants to obtain the leave of the judge who dismissed their earlier petition before filing a subsequent one, stating that this view was legally incorrect. The appellants filed the second petition only after the law regarding Section 148 of the N.I. Act was interpreted differently in Jamboo Bhandari, not for any other reason. The Court clarified that the appellants were not attempting a review, but seeking the application of the current law. Given this, the subsequent petition was valid. As a result, the Court allowed the appeal and instructed the Sessions Court to reconsider the issue of deposits in light of Jamboo Bhandari's case, rather than sending the matter back to the High Court.

Case- Muskan Enterprises & Anr. vs. The State of Punjab & Anr.

3. Section 354 IPC | To Establish Mens Rea, Something More Than Vague Statements Must Be Produced: Supreme Court Quashes Chargesheet

The Supreme Court recently stated that for Section 354 IPC (Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty) to apply, there must be the use of criminal force, and this force must be accompanied by the intention to outrage the woman's modesty. The bench, comprising Justices Sanjay Karol and C.T. Ravikumar, further emphasized that to prove mens rea, more than vague statements must be presented before the court. Simply making general claims of mental and physiccal discomfort is insufficient.

 The case involves a complaint filed by Respondent no. 2, a director at M/s LAJ-IDS Exports Pvt. Ltd., against the appellant for inappropriate behavior at the workplace, leading to charges under Section 354 and Section 506 of the IPC. The appellant approached the High Court to quash the complaint, but the Court denied the request, stating it could not conduct a "microscopic examination of facts and evidence." The matter was then brought before the Supreme Court, which clarified that while the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial, it must assess whether the alleged offences are prima facie established.

The Court stated that, without a detailed examination of the record, it must determine if there is any substance in the allegations that could meet the legal requirements. While criminal force is defined under the IPC, the Court noted that modesty is not explicitly defined. Relying on several cases, including Attorney General v. Satish, for the meaning of modesty, the Court reviewed the FIR and the respondent's statement. It concluded that no offence under Section 354 IPC was established, as the necessary ingredients were not met, and there was no evidence to prove the appellant's intent.

The Court emphasized that to establish mens rea, the evidence must be more than vague statements. It found that the FIR, preliminary investigation report, and chargesheet contained no direct allegations or evidence attributing intent to the appellant, and thus, no case under Section 354 IPC was made out. Regarding the offence of criminal intimidation, the Court stated that a mere statement without intent does not constitute the offence. Referring to Sharif Ahmed v. State of U.P., it explained that criminal intimidation occurs when the accused intends to cause alarm to the victim, regardless of whether the victim is actually alarmed, and the accused's intent must be supported by evidence.

The Court reviewed the FIR, interim investigation report, and chargesheet, concluding that no offence was disclosed. Before allowing the appeal, the Court discussed the High Court's power to quash criminal proceedings, citing precedents such as State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd., and State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, which allow for quashing when there is an abuse of the Court's process. Based on these observations, the Court set aside the High Court's judgment and quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellant.

Case- Naresh Kumar Aneja vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.