9 December 2024 - Legal Updates

1. YouTube Cannot Be Ordered to Remove Allegedly Defamatory Video Without Court Declaring It as Such

The Kerala High Court has made a significant observation regarding the role of social media platforms such as YouTube, stating that YouTube, as an intermediary, cannot be instructed to remove a allegedly objectionable video without a court order determining the video as defamatory in nature.

The above observation was made in civil writ petition filed in the case of Aneesh K. Thankachan v Union of India & Ors., where the petitioner had prayed to the Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Respondents to remove a specific video uploaded on Youtube and other videos with similar content. The petitioner claimed the video to be defamatory towards the Marthoma community and its Bishop. It is also alleged that the video is scandalous and has the potential to cause division among believers, leading to a disruption of peace and law and order.

Petitioner’s complaint and Youtube’s Response

The petitioner had filed a complaint with YouTube’s Resident Grievance Officer and the Principal Secretary of the IT Department under the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, regarding an objectionable video. Due to the authorities’ inaction, the petitioner approached the High Court, seeking a direction for YouTube to address the complaint. The petitioner argued that YouTube, as a social media intermediary, failed to regulate uploaded content, violating its user agreement and community guidelines. It was also stated that the Central Government could have blocked the video under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

YouTube informed the petitioner that videos could not be removed solely based on allegations of defamation and that they would comply with court orders. Citing the Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India (2015) case, YouTube argued that as an intermediary, it cannot act as a judge of the content uploaded on its platform.

Observation made by the High Court

The Court observed that to justify the removal of content under Section 69A of the IT Act 2000, there must be specific allegations that the video violates the reasonable restrictions outlined in Article 19(2), which would warrant its removal by the intermediary.

Referring to the observation made by the Apex Court in Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India (2015), the High Court noted that Section 69A, unlike Section 66A, is a narrowly defined provision with various safeguards. It explained that Section 69A can only be invoked when the Central Government is convinced that the video threatens India’ s sovereignty and integrity, defense, state security, friendly relations with foreign countries, public order, or is likely to incite the commission of a cognizable offense. Additionally, the reasons for blocking an online content / information must be recorded in writing, allowing them to be challenged in a writ petition under Article 226.

Explaining the scope of Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000, the Court stated that this section provides exemptions for intermediaries’ liability in certain situations. It emphasised that in the Shreya Singhal case, Section 79(3)(b) was interpreted to mean that intermediaries are required to remove third-party content only upon receiving a court order or a notice from the appropriate government authority. The Court noted that this approach is essential, as without it, intermediaries like Google, Facebook, and others would struggle to evaluate the legitimacy of the numerous requests they receive for video removal.

Conclusion

Based on the above reasoning, the High Court concluded that, the petitioner’s request for the removal of the alleged objectionable video from YouTube could not be granted without a court order declaring the video defamatory. It also noted that the content did not fall under Section 69A, as it was not related to issues like India’s sovereignty, defense, state security, or foreign relations. Apart from the defamation claim, there were no specific allegations that the video incited a cognizable offense concerning these matters. As a result, the Court ruled that YouTube could not be directed to remove the video without such a finding, and dismissed the writ petition.

2. No Promise of Marriage Can Be Made to a Married Woman, Proceedings for Rape Allegation Quashed

The Karnataka High Court in Akhil Thomas vs. State of Karnataka & Anr., while hearing a Criminal Petition for quashing criminal proceedings for alleged offences under Sections 376, 420 and 506 of the IPC, quashed the a rape case filed against a man by a woman he met on the ‘Bumble’ app, where the woman had listed herself as divorced in her profile. The Court stated that there can be no promise of marriage made to a woman who is already married.

Contention of the petitioner

The petitioner argued that all actions from the time they met until the registration of the crime were consensual, but were never based on a promise of marriage. The complainant, who was already married, had presented herself as divorced on the Bumble app. When the petitioner later discovered that she was still married, he claimed it constituted a breach of the alleged promise.

Findings of the Court

Upon reviewing the complaint and chargesheet, the court remarked that when the complaint and the summary of the chargesheet are read together, it becomes clear that there is no offence made out against the petitioner. This is because the complainant was already married, and her marriage was still valid when she falsely claimed to be divorced. Therefore, no promise of marriage can be made to a woman who is already married.

The court further stated that all the other alleged acts were consensual. Such consensual acts within a relationship between the petitioner and the respondent cannot be considered as rape under Section 376 of the IPC.

Allowing the petition, the court concluded that if the proceedings against the petitioner are not dismissed, it would, in essence, amount to an abuse of the legal process and lead to a miscarriage of justice.

As a result of the above reasoning, it subsequently quashed the criminal case proceedings against the petitioner before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.

3. Medical Testimony of a is Independent Evidence, Capable of Establishing Facts Beyond Oral Testimony

The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court while deciding a Criminal Appeal in Ravinder Singh vs. State of J&K, laid emphasis on the importance of medical evidence in criminal trials. It noted that the testimony of a medical witness plays a vital role in supporting the prosecution’s case. It is not just a verification of eyewitness testimony but serves as independent evidence, as it can establish facts that are separate from other oral evidence.

Brief Factual Background of the case

• The case originated from an incident in 2003, where Chandu Ram was allegedly ambushed by the appellant Ravinder Singh and his brother Hari Singh. The prosecution claimed that Ravinder Singh attacked the victim with a sword, causing severe injuries to his left shoulder and back, while Hari Singh, armed with a lathi, fled the scene without participating in the assault.
• The victim was rescued by nearby villagers, and a police case was filed, resulting in Ravinder Singh’s conviction by the Principal Sessions Judge, Kathua, under Sections 324, 325 of the RPC, and Section 4/25 of the Arms Act. Hari Singh was acquitted.

Arguments by the Parties

• Aggrieved by his conviction, the Petitioner in the appeal argued that the trial court in its decision primarily relied on hostile witnesses and lacked forensic evidence. He contended that the court had failed to provide the accused with a fair opportunity to explain all the incriminating circumstances as required under Section 342 of the CrPC.
• Furthermore, he highlighted the absence of the medical officer who issued the injury certificate, claiming that this could weakened the prosecution’s case.
• In contrast, the prosecution maintained that the victim’s testimony, supported by the recovery of the weapon, was sufficient to uphold the conviction. Despite some inconsistencies, the prosecution argued that the overall evidence clearly pointed to the accused’s guilt.

Observations of the High Court:

• While adjudicating the matter, the Court started by reiterating the principle that appellate courts must carefully reassess the evidence, especially in cases involving convictions. The Court referred to Lal Mandi v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1995 SC 2254), stressing that an appellate court is obligated to independently evaluate the evidence and cannot simply rely on the trial court’s findings if inconsistencies are evident.
• Central point of discussion was the importance of medical evidence, with the court highlighting that medical testimony is not secondary but independent evidence, capable of establishing facts that go beyond the testimony of eyewitnesses.
• The High Court criticised the prosecution for not producing the medical officer who issued the injury certificate, noting that this deprived the defense of the opportunity to cross-examine the doctor, thus weakening the prosecution’s case. In view of the Court this omission caused significant prejudice to the accused and compromised the integrity of the trial.
• Additionally, the court expressed concerns about the reliance on hostile witnesses. It acknowledged that while parts of hostile witness testimonies may be admitted, the testimonies in this case were inconsistent and lacked coherence. Given the contradictory statements made during cross-examinations, the court noted that convicting the accused based on such fragmented testimonies, without substantial corroboration, was legally untenable.
• The court stressed that in a criminal trial, suspicion, no matter how strong, cannot replace proof. It explained that the gap between “may be” and “must be” is significant, distinguishing vague conjectures from certain conclusions. The court stressed the importance of avoiding a miscarriage of justice and, if the facts warrant, giving the benefit of doubt to the accused. This doubt must be reasonable, based on reason and common sense, and not imaginary or trivial.
• Another important factor was the absence of forensic evidence. The court observed that the failure to submit the weapon for forensic examination was a significant oversight, as without evidence connecting the weapon to the injuries, the prosecution’s case lacked the essential evidentiary support.
• On significance of forensic evidence, the court also referred to the Supreme Court’s view in State vs. Laly (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1424), highlighting that while direct eyewitness testimony could suffice, corroborative forensic evidence is vital in cases where witness credibility is in question.

Conclusion

In line with these observations, the High Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the court allowed the appeal and acquitted the accused.