9 January 2025 - Legal Updates

1. Second Suit on Same Cause of Action Must Be Filed Within 3 Years of Rejection of Earlier Plaint: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court ruled that a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action would be time-barred if filed more than three years after the dismissal of the previous plaint. The Court dismissed the argument that Order VII, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure ("CPC") allows the filing of a fresh suit after the rejection of an earlier plaint. Instead, it emphasized that such a suit would be barred by the Limitation Act if filed beyond three years from the rejection of the previous suit.

The Court further stated that the subsequent suit would be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11(d) due to being barred by the law of limitation, as Rule 13 does not override the limitation period. In other words, the new suit must still adhere to the time limits specified under the Limitation Act. The bench, consisting of Justices BV Nagarathna and N Kotiswar Singh, was hearing an appeal against the Madras High Court's decision, which upheld the trial court's ruling dismissing the Appellant's application under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the CPC. The application sought the rejection of the Respondent's subsequent suit, filed nine years after the rejection of the original plaint.

The Appellant argued that both courts erred in dismissing the application for the rejection of the subsequent suit on the grounds of limitation. In contrast, the Respondent defended the position based on Order VII, Rule 13 of the CPC, asserting that the rejection of the earlier plaint does not prevent re-filing. In its judgment, authored by Justice Nagarathna, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the subsequent suit must be filed within three years from the date of the earlier plaint's rejection. The Court held that the Respondent could not file the suit beyond this limitation period.

The Court noted that the Respondent cannot invoke Rule 13 of Order VII, as the provisions of the CPC do not supersede the Limitation Act. Although filing a subsequent suit after the rejection of an earlier plaint is not barred, such a suit is only maintainable if filed within the three-year limitation period set out in Article 113 of the Limitation Act, with the time period beginning when the right to sue arises.

The Court observed, "The respondent/plaintiff had filed the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 26.04.1991 in 1993. The plaint in this suit was rejected on 12.01.1998. The plaintiff could have filed the second suit on or before 12.01.2001, as the right to file the suit arose on 12.01.1998, following the rejection of the earlier plaint. This is based on Order VII, Rule 13 of the Code. However, the limitation period expired in January 2001, and the second suit was filed in 2007, after the limitation period had expired. By then, the cause of action had faded, and the right to sue had been extinguished. Therefore, the suit was barred by law as it was filed beyond the prescribed limitation period under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. Hence, the second suit is barred under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code."

The Court further stated, "We have no hesitation in rejecting the plaint in O.S. No.49/2007 filed by the respondent, even without any evidence being recorded on the issue of limitation, given the admitted facts. Thus, based on Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code, read with Article 113 of the Limitation Act, we set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and the trial court and allow the application filed under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code. Consequently, this appeal is allowed."

Case- Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association vs. Sri Bala & Co.

2. Domestic Violence Act Cases Have No Penal Consequence Except For Breach of Protection Order: Supreme Court Criticises Issuance of Bailable Warrants

The Supreme Court criticized the Magistrate's decision to issue a bailable warrant in cases under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Court noted that there is no basis for issuing bailable warrants in such cases, as they involve quasi-criminal proceedings and do not result in penal consequences unless a protection order is breached.

The bench, consisting of Justice Sandeep Mehta, remarked, "This Court is compelled to observe that there was no justification for the Trial Court to issue bailable warrants in an application filed under the D.V. Act. The proceedings under this Act are quasi-criminal and carry no penal consequences, except in cases of violation or breach of a protection order. Therefore, the Magistrate was entirely unjustified in ordering the issuance of bailable warrants against the petitioner."

The Court was hearing a transfer petition seeking the relocation of a domestic violence case filed by the petitioner's mother-in-law under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The petitioner's counsel argued that the petitioner has a specially-abled minor son who suffers from hearing impairment. The petitioner is unemployed and completely dependent on her father for support. It was also highlighted that the lower court had issued bailable warrants against the petitioner.

Agreeing with the petitioner's argument, the Court decided to transfer the petition from Delhi to Ludhiana and deemed the issuance of bailable warrants against the petitioner unnecessary.

Case- Alisha Berry vs. Neelam Berry

3. Section 164 CrPC | Complainant is Entitled To Her Own Statement To Prefer A Protest Petition: Kerela High Court

The Kerala High Court recently ruled that a complainant can request a copy of her own statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC (Section 183 of BNSS) in order to file a protest petition. The petitioner, who was the complainant in a case investigated by the CBCID, had filed a protest after the CBCID submitted a final report in December 2023, stating that no offence had been made out and requesting the trial court to strike the crime from the records. Dissatisfied with this, the petitioner sought to file a protest complaint and applied to the magistrate's court to examine her statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC. However, her application was dismissed on October 5, 2024, prompting her to approach the High Court.

After reviewing the contents of the refer report, Justice C Jayachandran rejected the prosecution's argument that the report was not final and could be further investigated if new evidence was found. He stated:

"While it is true that further investigation can be conducted if new evidence emerges, as provided by Section 173(8) of the CrPC, [Section 193(9) of BNSS] this option does not impact the finality of a refer report or final report under Section 173(8) based on the facts established at that point. Regardless of the so-called finality, a dissatisfied de facto complainant has the option to file a protest complaint. Therefore, the right of the de facto complainant to receive a copy of her statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC cannot be questioned. Even the accused is entitled to receive a copy of the police report, the FIR, and all statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164, as per Sections 207 or 208, provided the precondition that this right can be enforced after the final report is filed and the Magistrate takes cognizance."

Before the High Court, the petitioner's counsel argued that the Magistrate's order, which relied on the Supreme Court's decision in A v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, was irrelevant to the present case. The counsel pointed out that the order cited by the Magistrate's court involved an application made by the accused before the investigation was complete, where the court had ruled that the accused was not entitled to a copy of the statement until the investigation was concluded and a report under Section 173 had been filed.

Distinguishing the judgment, the petitioner's counsel explained that in this case, the copy of the statement under Section 164 was being requested by the person who had given the statement, and this request was made after the investigation had been completed and the refer report/final report had been filed. The counsel further relied on Rule 226 of the Criminal Rules of Practice, which grants even a stranger the right to obtain copies of documents, provided sufficient cause is shown.

Meanwhile, the prosecution opposed the petition, arguing that this was not a case where a refer charge was filed after determining that the accused had not committed the offenses. The prosecution's counsel explained that, in this case, further proceedings were dropped due to insufficient evidence. Therefore, the prosecution argued that if incriminating evidence emerges later, a final report assigning guilt to the accused could be filed. As the investigation was not yet concluded, the prosecution contended that a copy of the Section 164 CrPC statement could not be issued to the petitioner.

Rejecting the prosecution's argument, the High Court stated, "In this case, final report/refer report has already been filed, and based on this, notice has been issued to the de facto complainant, as evidenced by the endorsement. Therefore, this Court believes that the petitioner/de facto complainant is entitled to a copy of her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Additionally, as per Rule 226 of the Criminal Rules of Practice, even a stranger is entitled to obtain copies of documents, provided sufficient cause is shown. It is important to note that a final report is a document filed before the court and is in the court's custody. In this case, the de facto complainant has shown sufficient cause—namely, to file a protest complaint against the refer report. Thus, the requirements of Rule 226 are also satisfied."

The High Court further stated that the trial court had incorrectly relied on A v. State of Uttar Pradesh, as that case involved the accused seeking a copy of the Section 164 CrPC statement before the final report was filed and before the court took cognizance.

Allowing the petitioner's plea, the Court set aside the Magistrate Court's order and directed it to issue a copy of the petitioner's statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC.

Case- Snigdha Kumar vs. The Inspector of Police and Another

4. Trial Court Passes Common Verdict Against Multiple Accused By Reviewing Order For Separate Trial In Murder Case, Punjab & Haryana High Court Sets Aside Conviction

The Punjab & Haryana High Court overturned the conviction in a murder case involving multiple accused persons, where the Trial Court had issued a common verdict after reviewing an earlier order that had directed their separate trials.

Justice Sureshwar Thakur and Justice Sudeepti Sharma stated, "The earlier order passed by the then learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rewari, on 02.07.2001, which directed the trial of co-accused Davender to be separated from the other seven co-accused, remained unchallenged and thus became binding and conclusive. As a result, it was impermissible to review this order, even though no objection had been raised by the defence counsel to the application filed by the learned Public Prosecutor. On the other hand, the learned trial judge, by allowing the application without any objection from the defence counsel, wrongly reviewed the earlier order dated 02.07.2001, in which the trial in the Sessions case titled State vs. Davender had been separated from the trial in the Sessions case titled State vs. Avtar Singh and Others."

The Court emphasized that the Trial Court’s decision to review its order, which had directed the accused persons to be tried separately, was "grossly impermissible." These remarks were made while hearing a batch of appeals against convictions in a murder case, in which the accused—Kartar Singh, Sube Singh, Phool Singh, Samar Singh, and Devender—had been sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC, (Section 103 read with section 190 of BNS) along with other provisions of the IPC and the Arms Act.

Speaking for the bench, Justice Thakur observed that the evidence from the trial of one accused had been "improperly consolidated" and applied to the trial of others. He referred to the Supreme Court's ruling in A.T. Mydeen and Another Vs. The Assistant Commissioner, Customs Department to emphasize that evidence recorded in a criminal trial against one accused pertains solely to that accused’s culpability and does not impact the trial of a co-accused, even if they are being tried for the same offense but in a separate trial.

While overturning the conviction, the Court remanded the matter to the Trial Court, instructing that the accused persons be tried separately with each assigned a distinct case number. The Court further clarified that separate judgments should be delivered following separate and distinct trials for each accused.

Case- Devender vs. State of Haryana