13 March 2025 Legal Updates

 Magistrate Cannot Switch Back to Pre-cognizance U/S 156 CrPC After Initiating Complaint Inquiry U/S 200 CrPC: J&K High Court

• Case- Renu Sharma and Anr. vs. Union Territory of  J&K and Another
• Date of Order- March 3, 2025
• Bench- Justice Sanjay Dhar

Case Involved: The Jammu and Kashmir High Court dealt with a case where the petitioners challenged an FIR registered under Sections 461 and 31 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police Station Bakshi Nagar, Jammu.

Complainant’s Allegations: The complainant, who was a tenant in a flat under a rent agreement with the petitioners, alleged that after returning from his native place, he discovered unauthorized entry into his apartment, and the main lock had been changed. The complainant also reviewed CCTV footage and accused the petitioners of committing house trespass, theft, and burglary.

Application to Magistrate: The complainant filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. before the Special Mobile Magistrate (Electricity), Jammu, requesting the registration of an FIR.

Trial Court's Action: The Special Mobile Magistrate, based on the application under Section 156(3), directed the police to register an FIR.

High Court's Judgment: The Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that once the magistrate recorded the preliminary statement of the complainant and directed an inquiry to ascertain the truth of the matter, the magistrate could not direct the police to register an FIR. The court ruled that Section 156 Cr.P.C. is related to the pre-cognizance stage, while Section 200 Cr.P.C. pertains to the post-cognizance stage. Once the magistrate opted for the complaint procedure and took the preliminary statement under Section 200, it was not permissible to revert to the pre-cognizance stage by directing the police to register an FIR.

Legal Precedent: The court referenced the case of Mohd. Aijaz vs. Sajad Ahmad Dar (2021) to support the argument that a magistrate cannot revert to pre-cognizance procedures after initiating the complaint inquiry.

Result: The High Court quashed the trial court's order that directed the registration of an FIR, ruling that the magistrate had erred in directing the police to register an FIR after choosing the complaint procedure.

 NI Act | Advisable to Impose Fine Equivalent to Amount of Cheque With Atleast 6% Interest For Uniformity: Punjab & Haryana High Court

• Case- Jugjit Kaur vs. Rajwinder Singh
• Date of Order- March 10, 2025
• Bench- Justice N.S. Shekawat

Case Involved: The Punjab and Haryana High Court was hearing a revision plea against an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge and a judgment passed by the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class. In the original case, the petitioner was convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs. 10,000.

Offense and Amount Involved: The case involved a cheque bounce issue under Section 138 of the NI Act. The complainant had been deprived of an amount of Rs. 19 lakh, which had become payable in April 2015 (about 10 years prior to the hearing).

Trial Court’s Decision: The trial court imposed a fine of only Rs. 10,000 and ordered the accused to undergo two months of additional imprisonment if the fine was not paid. No compensation was awarded to the complainant.

High Court's Observations:

• Uniformity in Fine Imposition: The court emphasized that to maintain uniformity in imposing fines in cheque bounce cases, the fine should generally be equal to the amount of the cheque, plus at least 6% interest per annum from the date of the cheque until the judgment date.
• Compensation Considerations: Before imposing a fine, the trial magistrate must account for any interim compensation paid under Section 143A of the NI Act or any amounts paid by the accused during the trial toward discharging the liability.
• Discretion on Imprisonment: The court noted that imposing imprisonment is at the discretion of the trial magistrate. However, the court suggested that the minimum sentence should be imposed unless the conduct of the accused warrants a different approach.
• Compensatory Objective: The court emphasized that the compensatory aspect of the remedy under Section 138 should be prioritized, reflecting the legislative intent behind the provision.

Reliance on Precedent: The court referred to Bir Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar, where the Supreme Court expressed concern about magistrates focusing only on punishment and not compensating the complainant. The court noted that delays in criminal proceedings could prevent the complainant from seeking civil remedies due to the expiration of the limitation period.

Court’s Criticism of Trial Court: The High Court criticized the trial court for imposing a meager fine of Rs. 10,000 and not awarding any compensation to the complainant. The High Court found that the trial court had "miserably failed" to consider the peculiar facts of the case.

Directive for Reconsideration: The High Court directed the trial court to reconsider the imposition of the sentence in light of its observations, keeping in mind the compensatory aspect of Section 138 of the NI Act. The case was remanded to the trial court for a de novo hearing.

Discretion on Fine: The High Court noted that under Section 138 of the NI Act, the trial magistrate has the discretion to impose a fine of up to double the amount of the cheque, which should be adequate to compensate the complainant.

Court’s Order: The High Court allowed the revision plea, remanding the matter back to the trial court for reconsideration, and directed that the trial court hear the parties afresh before imposing the sentence.

Party Can Inquire Case Status From His Counsel, Mere Lack of Communication With Lawyer Not Ground to Condone Delay in Filing Appeal: Rajasthan High Court

• Case- Saurendra vs. Bhugani & Anr.
• Date of Order- March 3, 2025
• Bench- Justice Manoj Kumar Garg

Case Involved: The Rajasthan High Court was hearing a revision petition filed by a husband (the petitioner) against an order of maintenance passed in July 2023. The petitioner had filed an appeal against this order in 2025, which was barred by a delay of two and a half years.

Trial Court's Decision: The trial court dismissed the appeal due to the delay in filing, as it was beyond the prescribed time limit.

Petitioner's Argument: The petitioner, a laborer working outside the state, claimed that he was not informed by his lawyer about the order of maintenance. He argued that once he became aware of the order, he filed the appeal, and the delay was purely bonafide.

Court's Observations:

• Section 5 of the Limitation Act: The Court referred to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows for condoning delays if there is a "sufficient cause." The Court noted that the purpose of limitation rules is to prevent dilatory tactics and not to destroy a party's rights.
• Interpretation of “Sufficient Cause”: The Court observed that "sufficient cause" should be interpreted liberally to promote substantial justice, but negligence, inaction, or lack of bonafide could not be excused under Section 5.
• Reference to Precedents:

1. The Court cited the Supreme Court case Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), which emphasized that Section 5 could not be liberally interpreted when negligence or lack of bona fide was involved.
2. The Court also referred to a Rajasthan High Court case Harish & Anr. v. Rajasthan Board of Muslim Waqf, where a similar issue was addressed. The court had held that litigants must be vigilant about their cases and could not merely blame their counsel for delays, especially if they failed to contact their counsel for an extended period.

Court's Conclusion:

• The petitioner failed to provide any legitimate explanation for the delay, especially for not checking with his counsel about the status of his case.
• The Court held that the petitioner's claims that his lawyer did not inform him about the order were not reasonable, and there was no valid justification for the excessive delay in filing the appeal.

Result: The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial court's decision to reject the appeal based on the delay.