23 November 2024 - Legal Updates

1. Section 14 Hindu Succession Act | Hindu Women Can Claim Absolute Ownership of Property Possessed under Her Antecedent Maintenance Right: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court stated that a Hindu woman can assert full ownership of property if it is associated with her pre-existing right to maintenance. The bench, consisting of Justice CT Ravikumar and Justice Sanjay Karol, explained that under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HSA), a possessory right becomes absolute ownership only if it is proven that the property was held in lieu of maintenance. However, the bench also clarified that if a Hindu woman acquires property through a written instrument or a court decree, and such acquisition is not linked to any pre-existing right, Section 14(2) would apply, preventing her from claiming absolute ownership of the property.

“The right to receive maintenance alone is enough to transform possession into full ownership if the woman holds the property in lieu of maintenance,” the Court stated. This observation was made while determining whether a Hindu woman, whose life interest in the property was established through a partition deed, could claim absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act (HSA). In response, Justice Sanjay Karol's judgment clarified that a Hindu woman is entitled to absolute ownership of property only if she acquired or received it as part of her pre-existing right to maintenance.

The Court stated that "the right to maintenance is enough for property given in lieu of it to become absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the HSA, 1956." The Court referred to the case of Jaswant Kaur v. Harpal Singh (1989), which upheld the principle established in Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh (1987), where the Court clearly outlined the distinction between subsections (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act.

 The Court stated in Gulwant Kaur's case, “It does not matter whether the property is acquired by inheritance, devise, partition, in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, by gift, through her own skill or effort, by purchase, prescription, or any other means. The explanation clearly mentions property acquired in lieu of maintenance, and we do not see any additional title the widow needs to prove before she can claim full ownership under Section 14(1) for property given to her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. The right to receive maintenance itself is sufficient to transform possession into full ownership, provided she holds the property in lieu of maintenance. Section 14(2) acts as an exception to Section 14(1) and applies to situations where property is acquired by a female Hindu through a written instrument or a court decree, not where the acquisition is linked to any pre-existing right.”

Applying the law to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that since the woman acquired possessory rights through a partition deed for a limited duration, rather than in lieu of maintenance, she was not entitled to claim absolute ownership of the property.

Case- Kallakuri Pattabhiramaswamy (dead) Through Lrs. vs. Kallakuri Kamaraju & Ors.

2. Marumakkathayan Law | Property Obtained By Hindu Woman Post-Partition Without Legal Heir Would Be Her Separate Property & Not Joint Property: Supreme Court

In an appeal regarding property devolution under Kerala's traditional Marumakkathayam law, the Supreme Court ruled that property acquired by a woman and her children after a partition does not become their separate property but continues to be part of the tharwad (joint family property). The bench, consisting of Justice CT Ravikumar and Justice Sanjay Karol, made this ruling while addressing the question of whether property obtained by a woman and her children post-partition would be considered separate property or remain with her tharwad.

The Court also addressed the issue of whether property acquired by a woman after a partition, in the absence of legal heirs, would be considered tharwad property or her separate property.

To address this issue, the Court conducted a thorough analysis of the Kerala High Court's Full Bench Judgment in the case Mary Cheriyan & Anr. vs. Bhargavi Pillai Bhasura Devi & Anr. (1967). The majority view asserts that if a woman is single (without legal heirs) at the time of partition, the property remains part of the tharwad, treated as belonging to a single-member thavazhi, thereby preserving the right for future claims by potential members through birth or adoption. In contrast, the minority opinion contends that if the woman is single during the partition, the property becomes her separate property, even if she later has children, as the partition inherently converts jointly held tharwad property into her individual property.

The judgment, authored by Justice Karol, rejected the majority opinion and instead endorsed the minority view. Relying on the principles of the Mitakshara school of law, the Court ruled that property held by a woman without a legal heir after partition would be considered her separate property, not tharwad property.

The Court reasoned that partition fundamentally changes the nature of property ownership. It viewed partition as a process that transforms joint ownership into individual ownership, ending the joint status and allocating separate shares to members, which will pass on to their heirs upon death. The Court held that once partition takes place, the joint nature of the property is dissolved, and any property allotted to a Hindu woman becomes her separate property. This remains true even if she has children later, as the partition establishes her individual ownership of the property moving forward.

The Court illustrated the concept with an example:

"It could be that a parcel of land, originally owned by fourteen people, is divided among them through a partition. If two individuals decide to no longer be associated with the group, both the size of the land they own and the number of registered owners are reduced. From this example, it follows that the two individuals who separated from the original group of fourteen become the sole owners of their respective portions, with the nature of ownership shifting from joint to individual."

In the present case, since the woman had a legal heir and was not single during the partition, the Court classified the property as tharwad property rather than her separate property.

Case- Ramachandran & Ors. vs. Vijayan & Ors.

3. Calcutta High Court Allows Infertile Couple To avail Assisted Reproductive Technique Although Husband’s Age Exceeded Statutory Limit

The Calcutta High Court has permitted an infertile couple to use Assistive Reproductive Techniques (ART) to help them conceive, despite the husband's age of 58 years exceeding the statutory limit set by the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Rules, 2022.

Justice Amrita Sinha stated: In this case, the woman falls within the prescribed age limit, but the man exceeds it. Due to the husband's age, the clinic is refusing to provide the service to the couple. However, the clinic or the bank has no authority to deny service if one partner of a married couple wishes to avail of the service. Had the wife approached the clinic individually, the clinic would not have been able to refuse ART services to her. Since the couple is in a harmonious relationship, they approached the clinic together as a commissioning couple.

The wife's medical report confirms that she is physically fit to carry the embryo. The wife should not be penalized due to the husband's ineligibility, as the husband does not physically participate in any of the procedures involved in the ART process for conceiving a child.

The petitioners, a married and childless couple, have enjoyed a happy conjugal life for the past thirty years but have been unable to conceive. They sought to use ART to have a child. However, their efforts were hindered by the husband's age, which exceeded the prescribed limit.

Under the Act, the service is available to women aged between 21 and 50 years, and to men aged between 21 and 55 years. While the wife-petitioner (no. 1) falls within the prescribed age range, the husband does not meet the age requirement.

The advocate representing the State respondents referred to the instruction issued by the Special Secretary (MERT) and Chairperson of the SAA under the ART and Surrogacy Act, Department of Health and Family Welfare, which stated that Section 21(g) prohibits providing the service to men over the age of 55.

In support of their request, the petitioners referenced an order passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court on 8th April, 2024, in WPA 12154 of 2023 (Sanchita Ghosh & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors.) and the judgment dated 26th April, 2024, in WPA 9232 of 2024 (Sudarshan Mandal & Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.).

The Court observed that the subject Act was enacted to address reproductive health issues, particularly where Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) is necessary for parenthood when natural biological processes fail to result in conception. Considering the father's role and the mother's continued eligibility to carry a child under the ART Act, the Court ruled in favor of allowing the couple to access ART services.

Case- X vs. State of West Bengal