3 January 2025 - Legal Updates

1. Husband Not Owner of Wife’s Body or Privacy; Sharing Intimate Videos Without Consent is a Breach of Trust and Privacy

The Allahabad High Court in a significant judgment has highlighted an important shift towards recognising a wife's autonomy and privacy within a marriage. It confronted outdated, patriarchal views by affirming that a wife's body, rights, and privacy should not be controlled or owned by her husband. The Court emphasised on the necessity of mutual trust and respect in relationships, condemning actions that violate this trust, such as sharing intimate videos without consent.

The Court made the observation while rejecting a petition filed by the applicant- husband, who was accused of secretly recording intimate acts without his wife’s knowledge or consent, uploading the video on Facebook, and sharing it with the wife’s cousin.

The applicant approached the High Court, challenging the chargesheet and seeking to quash the order and the entire criminal proceedings under Section 67B of the Information Technology Act.

Argument’s of the Parties

• The applicant argued that as the legally wedded husband of the complainant, no offence was committed under Section 67B of the IT Act. It was further argued on the behalf of the applicant that the FIR was fabricated, the victim's statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. shows significant discrepancies, and there is no evidence to suggest that the applicant made a video or uploaded it online.
• On the other hand, opposing the applicant's plea, the Additional Government Advocate (AGA) contended that serious allegations have been made against him. Despite the complainant being the legally wedded wife of the applicant, the AGA emphasised that he had no right to create an obscene video of her and share it with her cousin, through whom she became aware of her husband's actions.

View taken by the High Court

• The Court stated that a wife is not merely an extension of her husband, but an individual with her own rights, desires, and autonomy. It emphasised that respecting her bodily autonomy and privacy is not only a legal duty but also a moral responsibility of the husband in cultivating a truly equal relationship.
• The Allahabad High Court held an opinion that it is time for husbands to discard the outdated mindset of the Victorian era and understand that a wife’s body, privacy, and rights are her own, and not under the control or ownership of her husband. The Court viewed that a husband must respect the trust, faith, and confidence placed in him by his wife, and that sharing videos related to their intimate relationship constitutes a breach of the inherent confidentiality that defines the marital bond.
• On the point whether proceedings under IT Act were maintainable or not as the applicant being the legally wedded husband of the complainant, the High Court observed that Marriage does not bestow ownership or control of a wife to her husband, nor does it diminish her autonomy or right to privacy. By uploading an intimate video on Facebook, the applicant has severely violated the sanctity of the marital bond.
• Furthermore, The Court also commented on the breach of right to privacy which is protected by the Indian Constitution, including the right to bodily autonomy and the freedom to make personal decisions. In this regard, the Court cited the landmark case of Roe vs. Wade in the United States, where the principle of a woman’s control over her own body was affirmed as a constitutional right.
• The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's ruling in the case of K.S. Puttaswamy and Another v. Union of India and Others, where privacy was recognised as an essential aspect of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
• Summarising the above reasoning based on sanctity of marital relationship, right to privacy and legal and moral duty of a spouse the Court concluded that marital relationships are not exempt from the principle of privacy. A wife’s body is her own, and her consent is central to all aspects of her personal and intimate life. The husband's role is not that of a master or owner, but that of an equal partner, obligated to respect her autonomy and individuality. Any attempt to control or infringe upon these rights—whether through coercion, abuse, or the non-consensual sharing of intimate details—represents a severe violation of trust and legal principles.
• The plea of the husband was therefore dismissed.

2. Complainant Should Not Be Left Without Remedy Just Because of Filing a 'Premature' Complaint for Cheque Dishonour

The Rajasthan High Court in a significant ruling underscored the importance of adhering to the stipulated timeline under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for filing a cheque bouncing complaint. However, the Court also recognised the need for fairness by allowing the complainant to file a second complaint within one month if the first complaint was filed prematurely. This ensures that the complainant is not left without a remedy, aligning with the principles outlined in earlier Supreme Court decisions on the matter.

The observation came in case Moolchand vs. Bhairulal, where the Court was hearing an appeal against the judgment of Additional Sessions Judge that allowed the plea filed by the accused and acquitted him from the charge under Section 138 of the NI Act, on a technical ground that a premature complaint was filed by the appellant.

Important Facts of the Matter

• The case involves a cheque of Rs. 3,50,000 issued by the accused in favor of the complainant, which was dishonored due to insufficient funds in the accused’s bank account.
• The complainant had sent a legal notice to the accused on 28.08.2012, which the accused received on 01.09.2012. The accused replied on 06.09.2012, denying the transaction and the issuance of the cheque. A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed by the complainant on 14.09.2012. The legal notice under Section 138 was given to the accused before the expiry of the stipulated 15 days.
• The accused was subsequently tried and found guilty of the offense under Section 138. The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced him to one year of simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,00,000.
• Against this conviction, appeal was filed by the accused which was allowed on the grounds of the complaint being premature.

Observation of the Court

• The Court commented on the purpose of the law that the primary purpose of enacting such a law was to reduce the practice of filing premature complaints. However, the court observed that by allowing the filing of a fresh complaint in cases where complaints were submitted before the expiration of the mandatory fifteen-day period under Section 138(c) of the NI Act, a balance was achieved to ensure that the complainant is not left without a remedy.
• The High Court also remarked that the appellant should not be left without a remedy simply because a premature complaint was filed before the expiration of the statutory fifteen-day period. The legal principle Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium asserts that every legal wrong must have a remedy. Since the appellant suffered a legal injury due to the dishonor of the cheque issued by the respondent, their grievance must be addressed and examined on its merits.
• The High Court referred to precedents in Yogendra Pratap Singh vs. Savitri Pandey, (2015) AIR (SC) 157 and Gajanand Burange vs. Laxmi Chand Goyal, where the Supreme Court addressed two questions: (1) Whether a complaint filed before expiry of 15 days under Section 138 could be taken cognizance of? (2) If no, whether the complainant could file another complaint despite the expiry of one month stipulated in Section 142? Based on the legal principles established by the Supreme Court in these cases, the Court held that it is clear that if a complaint is filed before the expiration of the fifteen days period specified in the notice to be served upon the cheque drawer, the Court cannot take cognizance of the complaint. However, a second complaint based on the same cause of action is considered maintainable, and any delay in filing such a complaint will be deemed to have been excused.

3. Triple Talaq via E-Mail Constitutes Mental Torture; Husband's Unilateral Authority to Impose Instant Divorce is Unacceptable 

While deciding a plea to quash the charges against the applicant under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the Patna High Court  in matter of Aamir Karim vs. State of Bihar and another, has made an important observation that the view that a Muslim husband enjoys an arbitrary and unilateral power of inflicting instant divorce is not acceptable and that giving divorce to a Muslim wife by simply sending an e-mail to her amounts to a form of mental torture. The holding is a significant step toward addressing the misuse of the practice of instant divorce in Muslim marriages

Contentions of the Parties

• The applicant-husband claimed that he divorced his wife (respondent no. 2) on February 26, 2014, by sending her an email and an SMS, both containing the three talaq pronouncements. He further argued that his wife accepted the divorce, and thus, her subsequent complaint was filed with mala fide intentions.
• Challenging the contention, the wife (respondent no. 2) stated that at the time of marriage, the applicant received RS. 10 lakh in cash, ornaments, and clothes. However, after the marriage, the behavior of the petitioner and his family changed, and her mother-in-law took possession of her ornaments and cash. When she asked about her husband’s employment, the petitioner and his mother threatened to kill her and became hostile. In November 2013, she was sent back to her maternal home, and on February 26, 2014, the petitioner sent her an email issuing the triple talaq.

Ruling of the High Court

• The High Court while rejecting a plea to quash charges of dowry harassment and mental torture against a husband, was of view that the Supreme Court’s 2017 ruling on triple talaq would apply retrospectively, meaning it would also apply to instances of triple talaq pronounced before the judgment.
• The Court highlighted that while the complainant had acknowledged receiving the email containing the triple talaq communication, this alone did not absolve the petitioner from the charges of cruelty and dowry harassment. The allegations of mental torture, including dowry demands and mistreatment, would be examined separately.
• The Court also took into account that after marriage, the petitioner and his family subjected the complainant to mental torture and neglect, all occurring within six months of the marriage. Furthermore, the act of issuing triple talaq via email was deemed to constitute mental torture.
• The High Court also went into explaining the law relating to ‘talaq’ and remarked that the correct law of talaq requires that it be based on reasonable grounds and preceded by efforts for reconciliation between the husband and wife, with two arbitrators—one from each family—attempting to mediate. Only if these efforts fail, can talaq be pronounced. The view that a Muslim husband has the arbitrary and unilateral power to inflict instant divorce is not acceptable.