03 May 2025 Legal Updates

GANG RAPE | PENETRATIVE ACT BY ONE CAN IMPLICATE ALL IF THERE'S COMMON INTENTION; NEED NOT PROVE RAPE BY ALL: SUPREME COURT

(a) Case Title:

• Raju @Umakant vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India

(c) Date of Decision:

• May 1, 2025

(d) Bench:

• Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice K.V. Viswanathan

Facts

The case involves the appellant (Raju @ Umakant) and co-accused Jalandhar Kol who were convicted of kidnapping, wrongful confinement, and gang rape of the prosecutrix ('R').

According to the prosecution On June 23, 2004, the prosecutrix went to see a wedding ceremony with her friend 'SA'. While returning around 1:00 AM, they were intercepted by the accused; while 'SA' ran away, the prosecutrix was abducted. The accused took her on a two-wheeler to the appellant's house, where both accused raped her. She was later confined at different locations before being recovered on June 28, 2004

A missing report had been promptly filed by the prosecutrix's father on June 24, 2004

Issues

• Whether the testimony of the prosecutrix was reliable without corroboration
• Whether the ingredients of gang rape under Section 376(2)(g) IPC were established
• Whether the charge under SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 was sustainable

Court's Findings and Reasoning

(a) On Reliability of Testimony

The Court held that the prosecutrix's testimony was credible and inspired confidence despite minor contradictions. Relying on precedents like State of Rajasthan v. N.K. and State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, the Court reiterated that the testimony of a rape victim can be acted upon without corroboration if it inspires confidence.

(b) On Gang Rape under Section 376(2)(g)

The Court explained that Section 376(2)(g) embodies the principle of joint liability, where:

• If one person in a group commits rape while acting in furtherance of a common intention, all persons in the group are deemed to have committed gang rape
• It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove a completed act of rape by each accused
• The evidence clearly showed the appellant and co-accused acted in concert with common intention

(c) On Presumption of Lack of Consent

The Court applied Section 114A of the Evidence Act, which creates a presumption of absence of consent in gang rape cases when the prosecutrix states she did not consent. The defense failed to rebut this presumption.

(d) On SC/ST Act Charges

The Court acquitted the appellant of charges under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, finding:

While the statute requires that the offense be committed "on the ground" that the victim belongs to SC/ST community. There was no evidence to establish that the victim's caste identity was one of the grounds for the occurrence of the offense

Judgment

The Supreme Court:

• Maintained the conviction under Sections 366, 342, and 376(2)(g) IPC
• Set aside the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act
• Modified the sentence for the offense under Section 376(2)(g) from life imprisonment to 10 years rigorous imprisonment (making it equal to the co-accused's sentence)
• Maintained other sentences imposed by the trial court

Key Legal Principles

• A victim of sexual assault is not an accomplice but a victim, and her testimony can be relied upon without corroboration if it inspires confidence
• In gang rape cases, if one person commits rape while acting in furtherance of common intention, all are deemed guilty
• Section 114A of the Evidence Act creates a presumption of absence of consent in gang rape cases
• For conviction under the SC/ST Act, there must be evidence that caste identity was at least one of the grounds for the offense

FORFEITURE OF 'EARNEST MONEY' IS NOT PENAL IN ORDINARY SENSE SO AS TO APPLY SECTION 74 CONTRACT ACT: SUPREME COURT

(a) Case Title: 

• K.R. Suresh v. R. Poornima & Ors. 

(b) Court: 

• Supreme Court of India 

(c) Date of Decision: 

• 02nd May, 2025 

(d) Bench:  

• Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan 

Facts:

The appellant (K.R. Suresh) entered into an agreement with respondents (R. Poornima & others) for purchasing a property for ₹55.5 lakhs.  He paid ₹20 lakhs as "advance money" (treated as earnest money).  The balance ₹35.5 lakhs was to be paid within 4 months, failing which the advance would be forfeited. 

The appellant failed to pay the balance within the stipulated time, citing the respondents' inability to provide a probate certificate for the property (inherited via an unregistered will).  The respondents forfeited the advance and sold the property to another party (subsequent purchasers). 

The appellant sued for specific performance (enforcement of the sale agreement) but his plea was rejected in both the Trial Court and High Court. 

Issue:

Whether the appellant was entitled to a refund of the advance money ?

Court’s Analysis:

1. Validity of Forfeiture of Advance Money: 

• The Court distinguished between "earnest money" (security for performance) and "advance money" (part-payment) and held that the ₹20 lakhs was earnest money, forfeitable upon breach, as per the Agreement terms. 

2. Time as Essence of Contract: 

• The 4-month deadline was crucial because: 
• Respondents needed funds urgently for a One-Time Settlement (OTS) with their bank. 
• The appellant failed to prove readiness/willingness (no bank records or evidence of funds). 

3. Alternative Relief (Refund under Section 22, Specific Relief Act, 1963): 

• The appellant did not plead for a refund in the original suit or appeal. 
• The Court held that refund cannot be granted suo moto without a specific prayer.

4. Subsequent Buyers' Status: 

• The subsequent purchasers were bona fide buyers (no knowledge of prior Agreement). 

Decision:

The Court rejected the appeal and held that the appellant was not entitled to a refund of the advance money

Key Legal Principle

• Earnest Money vs. Advance Money:  Earnest money is a security deposit forfeitable on breach. Advance money is part-payment, refundable unless explicitly agreed as forfeitable. 

STAMP VENDORS ARE 'PUBLIC SERVANTS' UNDER PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT; LIABLE FOR BRIBERY OVER STAMP PAPER SALE: SUPREME COURT

(a) Case Title: 

• Aman Bhatia vs. State (GNCT of Delhi) 

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India

(c) Date of Decision: 

• 2nd May 2025 

(d) Bench: 

• Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan 

Facts:

The appellant, Aman Bhatia, a licensed stamp vendor, was accused of demanding an extra ₹2 for a ₹10 stamp paper from a complainant in 2003.  A trap was laid by the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB), and Bhatia was caught accepting the tainted money. 

The Trial Court and Delhi High Court convicted him under Sections 7 (bribery) and 13(1)(d) (criminal misconduct) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act), 1988. 

Issues

• Whether a licensed stamp vendor is a "public servant" under the PC Act? 
• Whether Bhatia’s conviction was valid? 

Court’s Analysis:

The Supreme Court analysed Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act, which defines a public servant as someone "remunerated by the Government for performing a public duty." 

The Court held that stamp vendors perform a public duty (ensuring access to stamps for legal transactions) and are remunerated via discounts under the Delhi Stamp Rules, 1934. Thus, they qualify as public servants. 

With reference to Bhatia’s conviction:

The Court found material inconsistencies in witness testimonies (complainant, panch witness, and Raid Officer) regarding the demand and acceptance of bribe.  The court observed that mere recovery of tainted money is insufficient and the prosecution must prove demand beyond reasonable doubt. 

 Due to lack of conclusive evidence, the conviction was set aside.