10 October 2025 Legal Updates

JUVENILE JUSTICE ACT 2000 APPLIES RETROSPECTIVELY: SUPREME COURT ORDERS RELEASE OF CONVICT WHO WAS JUVENILE WHEN CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN 1981.

(a) Case Title:

• Hansraj v. State of U.P.

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India

(c) Date of Decision:

• October 9, 2025

(d) Bench:

• Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Augustine George Masih

Facts of the Case

• The petitioner, born on June 10, 1969, was convicted of murder that occurred on November 2, 1981, when he was only 12 years and 5 months old. He was part of a group that assaulted the victim's father with knives and lathis, resulting in death. The trial court convicted him under Section 149 IPC and, recognizing he was about 16 years old at sentencing in August 1984, directed him to be kept in a children's home under the Children's Act, 1960 instead of jail.
• The High Court acquitted all accused in 2000, but the Supreme Court reversed this acquittal in 2009 and restored the original conviction. The petitioner absconded and was arrested only on May 19, 2022, remaining in custody for over 3 years and 8 months.

Legal Issues

Whether the petitioner was entitled to benefit of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, particularly Section 7-A inserted in 2006, which allows juvenility claims to be raised at any stage, even after final disposal.

Petitioner's Arguments:

Argued that as a juvenile, the maximum detention period was 3 years under Section 15(1)(g) of the JJ Act, 2000, and detention beyond this constituted illegal detention violating Article 21.

Respondent's Counsel:

Contended that the 1960 Act should apply since the offense occurred in 1981, that murder is a heinous offense deserving no mercy, and that the petitioner's absconding from 2009 to 2022 demonstrated culpability warranting discretionary refusal of relief.

Court's Reasoning and Judgment

• The Court noted that the petitioner was undisputedly 12 years 5 months old at the time of offense, and he had no specific role attributed to him—his conviction was based on Section 149 IPC as a member of an unlawful assembly.
• Relying on the Constitution Bench decision in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, the Court held that the JJ Act, 2000 applies to proceedings pending when it came into force, and persons below 18 years at the time of offense are treated as juveniles even if the claim is raised after they turn 18.
• The Court emphasized that Section 7-A permits raising juvenility pleas at any stage, even after final disposal under Article 136, and courts are obligated to grant appropriate relief if the convict was juvenile at the time of offense.
• Since the petitioner was indisputably a child at the time of offense and had been detained for over 3 years (exceeding the permissible period), his continued detention violated Article 21.

Decision

The Supreme Court allowed the writ petition and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner from Central Jail, Varanasi, if not wanted in any other case.

Key Legal Principles

• Juvenility claims can be raised at any stage of proceedings, even after final disposal
• Article 21 protection extends to juveniles; detention beyond statutory limits is unconstitutional
• Beneficial legislation for juveniles applies retrospectively

STAMP ACT | STAMP DUTY DETERMINED BY INSTRUMENTS' LEGAL CHARACTER, NOT ITS NOMENCLATURE: SUPREME COURT.

(a) Case Title:

• M/s Godwin Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, Meerut Division & Anr.

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India

(c) Date of Decision:

• October 8, 2025

(d) Bench:

• Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra

Facts

1. Appeal 1

Godwin Construction executed a "Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed" with Meerut Development Authority to secure obligations for developing a colony. The company mortgaged plots totalling 2,934.45 sq. meters worth ₹1,00,44,000/-. Stamp duty of ₹100 was paid under Article 57 of the Indian Stamp Act. Authorities demanded deficit stamp duty of ₹4,61,660 under Article 40 instead.

2. Appeal 2

Similar facts involving Ajay Forging Pvt. Ltd., which executed a "Security Bond or Mortgage Deed" with Allahabad Bank for a business loan of ₹1,66,00,000/-. Stamp duty paid under Article 57; deficit of ₹1,37,500/- demanded under Article 40.

Legal Issue

Whether stamp duty on instruments titled "Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed" should be charged under:

• Article 40 (Mortgage Deed), or
• Article 57 (Security Bond executed by surety)

Key Legal Principles

1. Substance over Form:

• In stamp duty matters, the substance of rights and obligations matters, not the nomenclature of the instrument.

2. Definition of Mortgage Deed:

• An instrument whereby a person transfers or creates a right over specified property to secure money advanced or performance of an engagement.

3. Article 57 has 2 limbs:

• First: Security for due execution of office
• Second: Executed by a surety to secure another's obligations

4. Surety Definition:

• A contract of guarantee is tripartite - involving surety, principal debtor, and creditor. The surety must be distinct from the principal debtor.

Court's Reasoning

• Both instruments satisfied the definition of "mortgage deed" under Section 2(17). The deeds were executed by the principal debtors themselves (the companies through their directors), not by third-party sureties. Article 57 requires a surety distinct from the principal debtor - this was absent.
• Directors acting on behalf of companies doesn't create a separate surety relationship. Therefore, instruments fall under Article 40 (Mortgage Deed), not Article 57 (Security Bond)

Judgment

Both appeals dismissed. The instruments were correctly charged stamp duty under Article 40 of the Indian Stamp Act.

JUDICIAL OFFICERS WITH 7 YEARS COMBINED EXPERIENCE ON DATE OF APPLICATION ELIGIBLE FOR DIRECT RECRUITMENT AS DISTRICT JUDGES: SUPREME COURT.

(a) Case Title:

• Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa and Others

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India

(c) Bench:

• Constitution Bench of 5 Judges - CJI B.R. Gavai, Justice Aravind Kumar, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, Justice K. Vinod Chandran, and Justice M.M. Sundresh

(d) Date of Decision:

• October 9, 2025

Background

This case dealt with the interpretation of Article 233 of the Constitution, which governs appointments of District Judges in Indian states. The central question was whether judicial officers already serving in subordinate courts could compete for District Judge positions through direct recruitment, or whether these positions were reserved exclusively for practicing advocates with seven years of experience.

Key Questions Before the Court

The Constitution Bench examined four main questions:

• Whether a judicial officer who completed seven years at the Bar before joining judicial service can be appointed as Additional District Judge against Bar vacancies?
• Whether eligibility should be assessed at the time of application, appointment, or both?
• Whether any eligibility is prescribed for persons already in judicial service under Article 233(2)?
• Whether a person with seven years of combined experience as both advocate and Civil Judge is eligible for appointment as District Judge?

Legal Provisions Examined

Article 233 of the Constitution:

• Clause (1): Deals with appointments, posting, and promotion of District Judges by the Governor in consultation with the High Court
• Clause (2): States that "a person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment"

Evolution of Judicial Interpretation

The Court traced the interpretation of Article 233 through several landmark cases:

Previous Key Judgments:

• Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Punjab (1960): Constitution Bench held that Article 233 is self-contained; no special qualifications required for persons already in service
• Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P. (1966): Constitution Bench clarified that "service" means "judicial service" and identified two sources of recruitment
• Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Allahabad (1985): This judgment began the restrictive interpretation, holding that only practicing advocates could apply for direct recruitment
• Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi (2020): Three-judge bench held that advocates must be in continuous practice for seven years and practicing on the date of application and appointment

Supreme Court's Analysis and Reasoning

The Court applied the principle of literal interpretation to Article 233, observing that Clause (1) deals with all appointments (including promotions and direct recruitment), while Clause (2) provides eligibility criteria specifically for advocates/pleaders but does not prescribe qualifications for in-service judicial officers.

Key Constitutional Principles Applied:

• No Provision Should Be Redundant: The Court held that if Article 233(2) only applied to advocates, the phrase "a person not already in the service of the Union or of the State" would become meaningless and redundant, which is constitutionally impermissible.
• Two Sources of Recruitment: The Constitution recognizes two sources for District Judge appointments: (i) persons already in judicial service, and (ii) advocates/pleaders with seven years' practice.
• Purpose of Recruitment: The Court emphasized that recruitment should aim to get persons of necessary qualification, experience, and knowledge of life, and the interpretation should not be "pedantic."

Rejection of Previous Interpretation:

The Constitution Bench overruled the line of judgments from Satya Narain Singh (1985) to Dheeraj Mor (2020), holding they incorrectly interpreted Article 233 and created an artificial barrier against judicial officers competing for direct recruitment.

Final Decision and Directions

Answers to Reference Questions:

• Question 1: YES - Judicial officers who completed seven years at the Bar before recruitment to subordinate judicial service are entitled to appointment as District Judge/Additional District Judge through direct recruitment.
• Question 2: Eligibility for appointment as District Judge is to be seen at the time of application.
• Question 3: Though Article 233(2) does not prescribe eligibility for persons already in judicial service, to provide a level playing field, a candidate should have seven years' combined experience as a judicial officer and advocate.
• Question 4: YES - A person with combined experience of seven years or more as an advocate or judicial officer is eligible for appointment as District Judge under Article 233.

Important Directions:

• Combined Experience Rule: Candidates applying as in-service candidates should have seven years' combined experience as a judicial officer and advocate to ensure a level playing field.
• Minimum Age Requirement: The minimum age for both advocates and judicial officers applying for direct recruitment should be 35 years on the date of application.
• Continuous Experience Required: Only persons with continuous experience (without significant breaks) as advocate/pleader or judicial officer shall be eligible.
• No Reservation for Advocates: The 25% quota for direct recruitment is not exclusively reserved for practicing advocates; judicial officers can also compete for these positions.
• Existing Recruitment Ratio Maintained: The Court maintained the existing 75:25 ratio for recruitment (75% through promotion/departmental examination and 25% through direct recruitment).
• Prospective Application: This judgment applies prospectively from the date of the decision; past selections and appointments remain unaffected except where interim orders exist.
• Timeline for Rule Amendment: All State Governments must frame/amend recruitment rules in consultation with High Courts within three months to align with this judgment.