6 January 2026 Legal Updates

Divorced Muslim Woman Can Claim Maintenance Under Section 125 CrPC Even After Receiving Amount Under Muslim Women Act: Kerala High Court

a) Case Title 

• Shereefa Munvara and Anr. v. Muhammed Kabeer

b) Court

• High Court of Kerala

c) Date of Decision

• 3 December 2025

d) Bench 

• Dr. Justice Kauser Edappagath

Facts of the Case

The case arose from a maintenance dispute between a divorced Muslim woman and her former husband. The marriage between the first petitioner and the respondent was solemnised according to Muslim customary rites in January 2010. Less than six months later, the respondent pronounced talaq, dissolving the marriage. A daughter was born from the wedlock.

On the date of divorce, an agreement was executed between the respondent and the petitioner's father (the wife being a minor at the time). Under this agreement, the wife received ₹1 lakh as matah and ₹25,000 towards iddat maintenance, and it was stated that she would not claim any future maintenance.

Subsequently, the wife and minor daughter filed an application under Section 125 CrPC, seeking monthly maintenance. The Family Court rejected the wife’s claim on the ground that the husband had already discharged his obligations under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, but granted ₹750 per month to the daughter. Aggrieved, the petitioners approached the Kerala High Court.

Issues Raised

• Whether a divorced Muslim woman can claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC / Section 144 BNSS after receiving benefits under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986?
• Whether an agreement waiving future maintenance bars a statutory claim under Section 125 CrPC?
• Whether the Family Court can dismiss a Section 125 application without examining the woman’s ability to maintain herself?

Contentions of the Petitioner

• The agreement executed at the time of divorce was void ab initio as the wife was a minor.
• The clause waiving future maintenance was against public policy and therefore unenforceable.
• Receipt of matah and iddat maintenance does not extinguish the statutory right under Section 125 CrPC.
• The amounts paid were inadequate to sustain the wife for her future livelihood.
• The maintenance awarded to the minor daughter was grossly insufficient.

Contentions of the Respondent

• The respondent had fully discharged his obligations under Section 3 of the Muslim Women Protection Act, 1986.
• Once reasonable and fair provision is made, a divorced Muslim woman cannot invoke Section 125 CrPC.
• The agreement was valid under Muslim personal law as the wife was represented by her father.
• The maintenance granted to the child was reasonable considering the respondent’s means.

Court’s Reasoning & Key Findings

1. Validity of the Agreement:

• The Court held that the agreement was valid, as Muslim personal law permits representation of a minor woman by her father (wali).
• Therefore, the agreement was not void merely because the wife was a minor.

2. Maintainability of Section 125 CrPC Application

• The Muslim Women Protection Act, 1986 does not extinguish the pre-existing right under Section 125 CrPC.
• Section 125 CrPC is a secular, welfare-oriented provision aimed at preventing destitution.

3. Reliance on Supreme Court Precedent

The Court relied heavily on Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana (2024), holding that:

• Rights under Section 125 CrPC and Section 3 of the 1986 Act co-exist.
• Even after receiving benefits under the 1986 Act, a divorced Muslim woman can invoke Section 125 if she is unable to maintain herself.

4. Duty of the Family Court

• The Family Court cannot mechanically dismiss a maintenance claim merely because an agreement exists.
• It must conduct a fact-specific inquiry into whether the amount received is sufficient for the woman’s sustenance.

5. Adequacy of Amount Paid

• The Court observed that ₹1 lakh as matah for lifetime maintenance was prima facie inadequate, especially when iddat maintenance worked out to ₹15,000 per month.
• The maintenance awarded to the minor daughter was also found to be insufficient

Final Verdict

Revision Petition Allowed

The Family Court’s order denying maintenance to the wife was set aside.

The matter was remanded to the Family Court for fresh consideration of:

• The wife’s claim under Section 125 CrPC
• Re-quantification of maintenance for the minor daughter

The Family Court was directed to dispose of the matter within six months.

Legal Principles Established

• Maintenance under Section 125 CrPC applies irrespective of religion and aims to prevent destitution.

2. Muslim Women Act Does Not Override Section 125 CrPC:

• The 1986 Act does not extinguish a divorced Muslim woman’s right under Section 125 CrPC.

3. Parallel Remedies Doctrine:

• Rights under Section 125 CrPC and Section 3 of the Muslim Women Protection Act co-exist and must be harmoniously construed.

4. Ability to Maintain Oneself is the Key Test:

• Even after receiving matah or iddat maintenance, the court must assess whether the woman can sustain herself.

5. No Automatic Bar Due to Agreement:

• An agreement waiving future maintenance cannot automatically bar a statutory claim under Section 125 CrPC.

Making a Child Touch Private Parts with Sexual Intent Amounts to Aggravated Sexual Assault under POCSO Act: Delhi High Court

a) Case Title

•  Dharmendra Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi)

b) Court 

• Delhi High Court

c) Date of Decision

• 5th January 2026

d) Bench

Justice Neena Bansal Krishna

Facts of the Case

The case arose from a 2022 incident involving a three-year-old girl. The child informed her mother that a tenant living in the same building had exposed his private parts and made the child touch them with sexual intent. Based on this disclosure, the mother lodged a criminal complaint.

After investigation and trial, the Sessions Court convicted the accused for aggravated sexual assault under the POCSO Act and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. The accused challenged this conviction before the Delhi High Court, questioning the reliability of the child’s testimony.

Issues Raised

• Whether making a minor child touch an adult’s private parts with sexual intent constitutes aggravated sexual assault under the POCSO Act?
• Whether minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a very young child can discredit the prosecution case?
• Whether conviction can be sustained on the testimony of a child victim corroborated by her mother?

Contentions of the Petitioner (Accused)

• The child gave inconsistent statements, initially alleging inappropriate touching and later claiming “insertion”, making her testimony unreliable.
• Due to her tender age, the child was susceptible to tutoring and exaggeration.
• Absence of independent or medical corroboration weakened the prosecution case.
• Conviction under Sections 354, 354A and 354B IPC was illegal as no charges were framed under these provisions.

Contentions of the Respondent (State)

• The core allegation of sexual assault remained consistent throughout the child’s statements.
• Minor variations in expression were natural due to the child’s young age and limited vocabulary.
• The mother’s testimony and the initial complaint fully corroborated the child’s version.
• Sexual intent was clearly established, attracting aggravated sexual assault under Section 10 of the POCSO Act.

Court’s Reasoning & Key Findings

1. Appreciation of Child Testimony

• The Court held that while evaluating a child witness, tender age and limited vocabulary must be kept in mind.
• Minor improvements or variations in language do not amount to material contradictions.

2. Scope of Aggravated Sexual Assault under POCSO

• Making a child touch private parts with sexual intent squarely falls within aggravated sexual assault.
• Penetration is not mandatory to attract liability under Section 10 POCSO Act.

3. Credibility and Corroboration

• The child’s testimony was consistent on material aspects and corroborated by her mother and the initial complaint.
• The accused’s defence was found inconsistent and unreliable.

Final Verdict

• Appeal partly allowed
• Conviction and sentence under Section 10 POCSO Act upheld
• Conviction under Sections 354, 354A and 354B IPC set aside
• Sentence of seven years’ imprisonment under POCSO Act confirmed

Legal Principles Established

1. Meaning of Aggravated Sexual Assault (POCSO):

• Making a child touch an adult’s private parts with sexual intent constitutes aggravated sexual assault, even without penetration.

2. Child Witness Testimony:

• Minor inconsistencies in a child’s statement do not destroy credibility if the core allegation remains consistent.

3. Corroboration Rule:

• Conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the child victim if it inspires confidence and is supported by surrounding circumstances.

4. Procedural Fairness in Criminal Trials:

• An accused cannot be convicted for offences for which no charge has been framed, even if evidence exists.