4 December 2025 Legal Updates

S. 354C IPC | TAKING PHOTOS OR VIDEOS OF WOMAN WHEN SHE'S NOT ENGAGED IN PRIVATE ACTS WON'T AMOUNT TO VOYEURISM: SUPREME COURT

(a) Case Title:

• Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. State of West Bengal

(b) Court & Date:

• Supreme Court of India

(c) Date of Decision:

• December 02, 2025

(d) Bench:

• Justice Manmohan and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh

Key Facts

The case arose from an FIR filed by Mamta Agarwal against the appellant (Tuhin Kumar Biswas) alleging offences under Sections 341 (wrongful restraint), 354C (voyeurism) and 506 (criminal intimidation) IPC.

The incident occurred on March 18, 2020, when the complainant, along with her friend and workmen, tried to enter a property in Salt Lake, Kolkata, which was jointly owned by the appellant’s father and his uncle, Amalendu Biswas. The appellant objected to their entry, clicked pictures/videos of the complainant, and allegedly prevented her from entering the property.

A civil suit was already pending between the co-owners regarding the same property, and an injunction order dated November 29, 2018, directed both parties to maintain joint possession and not create third-party rights. The complainant later expressed unwillingness to record a judicial statement under Section 164 CrPC. The trial court and the High Court rejected the appellant’s discharge application, leading to an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues

• Whether the allegations in the FIR and chargesheet disclosed offences under Sections 341, 354C, and 506 IPC?
• Whether the appellant could be discharged under Section 227 CrPC due to lack of strong suspicion?
• Whether criminal proceedings should continue when a civil dispute and injunction were already in place?

Supreme Court’s Reasoning & Ruling

• On Section 354C IPC (Voyeurism): The Court held that no offence under Section 354C was made out. Voyeurism requires watching/capturing a woman engaged in a "private act" (e.g., in a private place where privacy is expected). Merely clicking pictures in a common/shared property does not satisfy the definition. The High Court had also observed the same.
• On Section 506 IPC (Criminal Intimidation): The FIR contained only a bald allegation without specifics of threat or injury. No statements from the complainant or witnesses substantiated the claim. The ingredients of criminal intimidation were not attracted.
• On Section 341 IPC (Wrongful Restraint): Wrongful restraint requires obstruction of a person who has a lawful right to proceed in a direction. Here, the complainant was not a tenant but only a prospective tenant. The appellant, in good faith, believed he had a lawful right to prevent entry in light of the civil injunction. Hence, no offence of wrongful restraint was made out.
• On Discharge & Strong Suspicion Principle: At the discharge stage, the court must see if there is a strong suspicion to proceed. If only a mere suspicion exists, discharge should be granted. The judge is not a post office and must apply judicial mind. In this case, no strong suspicion existed, especially given the pending civil suit and lack of evidence.
• Observations on Judicial Burden: The Court expressed concern over frivolous chargesheets and framing of charges without strong suspicion, which clogs the judicial system. Police and courts should act as effective filters to ensure only genuine cases proceed to trial.

Final Decision

Appeal allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside.

Key Takeaways

• Discharge under Section 227 CrPC is permissible if no strong suspicion exists.
• Criminal law should not be used to settle civil disputes – especially when injunctions are in place.
• Ingredients of offences must be clearly satisfied – bald allegations are insufficient.

PARENT'S WORK-FROM-HOME STATUS ALONE CANNOT DETERMINE CHILD CUSTODY: SUPREME COURT

(a) Case Title:

• Poonam Wadhwa vs. Ajay Wadhwa & Ors.

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction

(c) Date of Decision:

• November 25, 2025

(d) Bench:

• Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan

Background

The appeal challenged an order of the Punjab & Haryana High Court dated July 1, 2024, which had overturned earlier orders granting custody of the minor son, Arjun Wadhwa, to the mother (appellant) and instead placed him in the father’s custody.

Key Issues

• Whether the High Court’s decision was influenced by irrelevant factors such as: One parent working from home vs. office; Distance from the child’s school or the mother’s travel abroad during the Covid-19 pandemic.
• Whether the sibling bond (between Arjun and his sister, who lived with the mother) should be prioritized.
• Whether the father’s request to cancel the mother’s visitation rights should be granted.

Supreme Court’s Observations

• Working Parents: A parent working from home is not necessarily better suited for custody. Both parents may work to support the family.
• School Distance: In metropolitan areas like Delhi NCR, travel time to school is not a decisive factor.
• Covid-19 Travel: Travel for work or vacation, especially when vaccinated, should not be held against a parent.
• Child’s Preference: The Court noted that Arjun (above 5 years) was unwilling to leave his father’s company and was comfortable in his current environment, which included extended family support.
• Sibling Bond: While important, it did not override the child’s settled routine and preference.

Decision

The Supreme Court dismissed the mother’s appeal and upheld the High Court’s order granting custody to the father. The Court rejected the father’s application to cancel the mother’s visitation rights. It emphasized that custody issues could still be pursued under relevant statutes in the Family Court.

Key Takeaway

In custody disputes, the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. Factors like the child’s preference (especially if older), stability, and emotional well-being are weighed more heavily than logistical conveniences. Courts are reluctant to disturb a child’s settled environment unless compelling reasons exist. Visitation rights are generally preserved to ensure the child maintains a relationship with both parents.

'UNILATERAL APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATOR VIOLATES PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE': CALCUTTA HIGH COURT SETS ASIDE ARBITRAL AWARD

(a) Case Title:

• Y D Transport Company & Another vs. SREI Equipment Finance Limited

(b) Court:

• High Court at Calcutta

(c) Date of Decision:

• 02.12.2025

(d) Bench:

• Hon’ble Justice Shampa Sarkar

Background

This case is an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, challenging an arbitral award dated December 28, 2017. The dispute arose from a loan agreement for the purchase of heavy vehicles. The petitioners contended that the award was passed in violation of fundamental arbitration principles.

Key Issues Decided

1. Limitation under Section 34(3):

• The petitioners claimed they received the award only on April 9, 2019, when served with an execution petition.
• The Court held that the limitation period (3 months + 30 days) began from April 9, 2019, and the application filed on July 5, 2019 was within time.
• No deemed service under Section 3(1)(b) was applied due to lack of proof of dispatch of the signed award.

2. Jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court:

• The respondent argued that Section 42 barred the Calcutta Court because execution proceedings were pending in Jamshedpur.
• The Court held that Section 42 applies only to proceedings under Part I of the Act.
• Execution under Section 36 is not a proceeding under Part I but under the CPC.
• Following Sundaram Finance (2018), the Court ruled that execution can be filed anywhere; it does not oust jurisdiction of the seat court (Kolkata) to entertain a Section 34 application.

3. Unilateral Appointment of Arbitrator – Violation of Section 12(5):

• The arbitration clause allowed unilateral appointment by the respondent company.
• The Court held this violated Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, as amended in 2015.
• Relying on Perkins Eastman (2019) and Central Organisation for Railway Electrification (2024), the Court held unilateral appointment is de jure invalid and violates principles of impartiality and equal treatment (Sections 18 and 12(5)).
• No express written waiver under Section 12(5) existed; mere participation does not constitute waiver.

4. Issue Estoppel:

• The petitioners had earlier raised the same issue before the executing court in Jamshedpur, which was dismissed.
• The High Court held that the issue was not finally decided and could be agitated in a Section 34 proceeding.

5. Validity of the Award:

• The award was set aside as a nullity due to improper constitution of the tribunal.
• The arbitrator lacked mandate, and the award was contrary to public policy and tainted by bias.

Final Order

The arbitral award was set aside. The application under Section 34 was allowed.

Key Legal Principles

• Section 34 Limitation: Period starts from actual receipt of a signed copy of the award.
• Section 42 Jurisdiction: Applies only to Part I applications, not to execution under Section 36.
• Unilateral Appointment: Is per se invalid post-2015 Amendment; violates Section 12(5) & Seventh Schedule.
• Waiver under Section 12(5): Must be by express written agreement post-dispute; conduct or participation is not waiver.
• Award as Nullity: If tribunal is improperly constituted, the award is void ab initio.