1 December 2025 Legal Updates

ARBITRATION | NO REVIEW OR APPEAL LIES AGAINST ORDER APPOINTING ARBITRATOR: SUPREME COURT

(a) Case Title:

• Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. vs. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Limited & Others

(b) Court:

• Supreme Court of India

(c) Date of Decision:

• November 28, 2025

(d) Bench:

• Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan

Background & Procedural History

• The appellant (HCCL) had a 2014 contract with a Bihar government undertaking (BRPNNL) containing Clause 25 for arbitration of disputes. An earlier dispute under this clause was arbitrated, an award was passed, and the respondent complied.
• A fresh dispute arose. The respondent's Managing Director (the designated appointing authority) failed to appoint an arbitrator. The Patna High Court, under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act, appointed a sole arbitrator in August 2021. Both parties actively participated in the arbitration for over 3 years, conducted 70+ hearings, and jointly sought extensions of the arbitrator's mandate under Section 29A.
• After extensive proceedings, the respondent filed a review petition before the High Court, challenging the very appointment of the arbitrator. The High Court allowed the review and later dismissed the entire Section 11 petition, effectively terminating the arbitration.

Key Legal Issues Decided by the Supreme Court

1. Can a High Court review its own order made under Section 11 for arbitrator appointment?

Held: No. The Supreme Court strongly emphasized the principle of minimal judicial intervention under the Arbitration Act. An order under Section 11 is final for the purpose of triggering arbitration. The court becomes functus officio (ceases to have official authority) after the appointment. A review at a later stage, especially after years of proceedings, undermines the Act's objective of expediency and finality. The proper remedy for the respondent was to challenge the award under Section 34 after it was made, not to review the appointment order mid-way.

2. Does a valid arbitration agreement exist if the appointment mechanism is flawed?

Held: Yes. The Court distinguished between the existence of an arbitration agreement and the validity of the appointment procedure.

Clause 25 had two parts:

• Part A: A clear agreement to refer disputes to arbitration.
• Part B: A condition that only the respondent's Managing Director could appoint, and if he couldn't, "the matter shall not be referred to arbitration at all."

The Court held that Part B was a unilateral and arbitrary appointment clause, violating the principles of neutrality and equality (Section 18). Following precedents like TRF Ltd. and Perkins Eastman, such a clause is void and severable. The core agreement to arbitrate (Part A) survives. The defect in the appointment mechanism can be cured by the court under Section 11(6).

3. Does jointly applying for an extension of mandate under Section 29A amount to a waiver of objections?

Held: Yes, under Section 4. The Court drew a clear distinction:

Section 12(5) Ineligibility (e.g., arbitrator's relationship with a party): Waiver requires an express post-dispute agreement in writing. Other Procedural Objections (like the one here) are governed by Section 4. If a party, aware of a defect, proceeds with arbitration without undue delay in objecting, it is deemed to have waived the right to object. By jointly seeking extensions under Section 29A multiple times over three years, the respondent waived its right to later challenge the arbitrator's appointment or the existence of the arbitration agreement.

Important Principles (Doctrines & Sections)

• Principle of Minimal Judicial Intervention (Sections 5 & 11): Courts should not interfere in arbitration except where the Act specifically provides.
• Doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz (Section 16): The arbitral tribunal has the primary authority to rule on its own jurisdiction, including objections to the arbitration agreement.
• Doctrine of Severability: An illegal or unenforceable part of a contract (like a flawed appointment clause) can be severed, allowing the rest of the agreement (the agreement to arbitrate) to stand.
• Waiver by Conduct (Section 4): A party cannot "approbate and reprobate." Active participation in arbitration without timely objection implies waiver of procedural irregularities.
• Finality of Section 11 Orders: Once an arbitrator is appointed under Section 11, the court's role ends. It cannot be reopened via review in a routine manner.
• Substitution, Not Restart (Section 15): If an arbitrator becomes unavailable, a substitute is appointed to continue proceedings from the stage left, not start afresh.

Final Outcome & Directions

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment. It held that a valid arbitration agreement existed. It directed the High Court to appoint a substitute arbitrator within two weeks. The new arbitrator must continue the proceedings from where they were interrupted (i.e., from the stage of final arguments) and try to conclude within one year.

DENYING DAUGHTER-IN-LAW TO ACCOMPANY ON TEMPLE VISIT NOT CRUELTY: GUJARAT HIGH COURT UPHOLDS IN-LAWS ACQUITTAL IN 498A IPC, DOWRY DEATH CASE

(a) Case Title: 

• State of Gujarat vs. Rajeshbhai Pitamberbhai Parmar & Ors.

(b) Court: 

• High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad

(c) Date of Decision: 

• 19th November 2025

(d) Bench: 

• Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ilesh J. Vora and Hon’ble Mr. Justice R. T. Vachhani

Brief Facts

The deceased, Pushpaben Bhikubhai Mekwan, was married to respondent No. 1 about two years before the incident. On 17.01.1999, she allegedly consumed Celphos poison due to dowry-related harassment and died during treatment. The accused (husband and in-laws) were charged under Sections 498A, 306, 201, 176, and 304B read with Section 114 IPC. The Sessions Court acquitted the accused. The State appealed against this acquittal.

Key Legal Issues

• Whether the prosecution proved cruelty under Section 498A IPC?
• Whether abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC was established?
• Whether presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act (suicide within 7 years of marriage) could be invoked?
• Whether dowry death under Section 304B IPC was proved?
• Whether the acquittal by the trial court was perverse or unsustainable?

High Court’s Analysis & Decision

• On Cruelty (Section 498A IPC): The prosecution failed to prove specific, wilful, and persistent cruelty. Witness testimonies were vague, general, and contradictory. No independent or corroborative evidence of recurring ill-treatment. The incident of not allowing the deceased to visit a temple was trivial and part of ordinary matrimonial wear and tear.
• On Abetment of Suicide (Section 306 IPC): No instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aiding was proved. The suicide appeared to be a spontaneous, impulsive act due to emotional sensitivity, not abetment. The husband immediately took her to the hospital, negating any intention to abet.
• On Presumption Under Section 113A Evidence Act: Presumption is discretionary, not automatic. It applies only if cruelty is proved — which was not established. Hence, presumption could not be invoked.
• On Dowry Death (Section 304B IPC): No proof of dowry demand “soon before death”. Allegations of dowry demands were not mentioned in the FIR and surfaced later in witness testimonies. Presumption under Section 113B Evidence Act could not be drawn.
• On Other Charges (Sections 201 & 176 IPC): Burial without post-mortem was due to religious customs, not to destroy evidence. No proof of intention to screen from legal punishment. Charges could not be sustained.

Final Ruling

The acquittal by the Sessions Court was upheld. The prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was dismissed.

Key Takeaways

• Section 498A IPC: Cruelty must be wilful, persistent, and of such nature as to drive a woman to suicide.
• Section 113A Evidence Act: Presumption of abetment is discretionary and not automatic; cruelty must first be proved.
• Section 306 IPC: Requires active instigation or intentional aiding.
• Acquittal Appeals: High Court will not interfere unless the trial court’s view is perverse or impossible.
• Burden of Proof: Prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; mere suspicion is insufficient.